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Article III as a Fundamental Value-The Demise of
Northern Pipeline and Its Implications for
Congressional Power
GEORGE D. BROWN*
The Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipeline Co. I appeared to be one of those landmark cases that move the
law in significant new directions. Northern Pipeline struck down an attempt by
Congress to transfer responsiblity for a broad range of bankruptcy adjudication to
federal officials who were not article I judges. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion
is a ringing affirmation of the central role of article III courts, and judges, within the
national government. Relying heavily on the language of the Constitution and the
apparent intent of the framers, the opinion expresses a presumption in favor of article
II adjudication, subject to narrow exceptions. Northern Pipeline is more than a
reminder of the judiciary's co-equal role within the national scheme of separation of
powers. Read broadly, Justice Brennan's opinion casts doubt upon the validity of a
wide range of non-article III adjudicative mechanisms, including decision making by
administrative agencies and the current use of magistrates in federal courts.2
The generative force of Northern Pipeline, was, however, uncertain from the
outset. Justice Brennan's analysis did not attract a majority of the Court.3 Many
commentators were extremely critical of his opinion.4 They found fault with his
methodological approach, poked holes in his doctrinal analysis, and recoiled from the
possible consequences. Thus, one could cite Northern Pipeline as anything from a
bold first step to an aberration. Within four years a majority of the Court appears to
have opted for the latter view. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.5
and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor6 rejected attempts to extend
Northern Pipeline and accorded Congress considerable latitude in choosing adjudi-
cative mechanisms, at least where administrative agencies are involved and some
degree of appellate review in an article III court is provided. Inevitably, these cases
raise the question of whether the Northern Pipeline "doctrine," assuming there ever
was one, is now defunct.
This Article examines Northern Pipeline and its successor cases in an effort to
measure how far these two swings of the pendulum actually extended and whether the
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; A.B., 1961, Harvard College; L.L.B., 1965, Harvard Law
School. An initial version of this Article was presented at a Boston College Law School Faculty colloquium.
1. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 555 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1985) (dissenting opinion) (magistrates); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 587-88 (1985) (administrative agencies).
3. Justice Rehnquist, for himself, and Justice O'Connor concurred, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 89 (1982). Justice White, for himself, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell dissented.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. 458 U.S. 50, 92 (1982).
4. E.g., Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUE
L.J. 197 (1983) [hereinafter Redish]; The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. Rsv. 62, 257 (1982).
5. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
6. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
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principles articulated by Justice Brennan might still serve as effective constraints on
Congress. Section I deals with the Northern Pipeline case, focusing both on Justice
Brennan's vision of the federal judiciary and on the serious criticisms levelled against
his opinion. Section II considers the Court's hasty retreat from Northern Pipeline,
examining the mode of analysis in Thomas and Schor as well as the actual holdings.
This consideration suggests that, from the point of view of Northern Pipeline's
defenders, the retreat is a rout. Section III attempts to explain this reversal. While
answers may lie in the decision's internal weaknesses and its implications, two
further explanations are assayed: changing approaches to questions of separation of
powers, and the possibility that a majority of the current Court simply does not share
Justice Brennan's view of the importance of article II tribunals. A fundamental
theme of the Burger Court's jurisprudence has been the need to constrain the federal
judiciary in both public and private law matters. This attitude may tell us something
about the post-Northern Pipeline deference to Congress.
Northern Pipeline, however, has not been overruled. With this in mind, Section
IV considers its possible continuing applicability in three areas: administrative
adjudication, congressional power over federal court jurisdiction, and the use of
alternative judicial mechanisms such as magistrates. In the first area constraints on
Congress appear to be few. As for the second area, the Northern Pipeline trilogy does
serve to reinforce prevalent notions of congressional power over lower federal court
jurisdiction. At the same time the Court's continuing insistence that there is some
irreducible "essential" role for the federal judiciary supports arguments that
Congress' power over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is subject to
inherent constitutional limits. As for the third area, Northern Pipeline may yet
resurface as an important brake on efforts to alter the form of adjudication within
article I courts.
I. NORTHERN PPELINE AND rrs VISION OF THE ARTICLE I JUDICIARY
A. The Article III Judiciary According to Justice Brennan
At issue in Northern Pipeline was Congress' assignment of bankruptcy disputes
to "bankruptcy courts" staffed by "bankruptcy judges" who did not enjoy the tenure
and salary provisions of article I.7 They were appointed by the President for terms
of fourteen years, not for life; they could be removed by the judicial council of the
relevant circuit on grounds seemingly broader than the "good behavior" standard of
article 1-;8 and Congress could lower their salaries. These non-article III tribunals
were authorized to adjudicate a broad range of matters including claims based on state
law. In Northern Pipeline the defendant in a state law contract action challenged on
constitutional grounds the bankruptcy court's power to hear the case. The Supreme
Court struck down the statute by a margin of six to three.
7. For a general description of the system, see Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S.
50, 52-56 (1982).
8. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
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Writing for a plurality of four, Justice Brennan utilized the case as the vehicle
for a general exposition of the role of the federal courts. His first step was to posit
recourse to those courts as the norm for initial adjudication at the federal level. 9 He
then analyzed a number of exceptions to this norm, and concluded that the bankruptcy
courts did not fit within any of the exceptions.' 0 Justice Brennan's opinion is
significant in a number of aspects, not the least of which is his attempt to bring
schematic clarity to a subject generally viewed as mired in chaos and confusion."
Of particular importance is his vision of the status and role of the federal
judiciary. This vision is developed in the opening portion of the opinion, where he
establishes the presumption in favor of article III adjudication. This segment of the
opinion is a latter day counterpart to that of Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank
of the United States .12 Anxious to affin the scope of the national judiciary, Marshall
declared that "the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of every well con-
structed government are co-extensive with each other," and that the "framers kept
this great political principle in view.' 13 In a similar vein, Justice Brennan emphasizes
the co-equal status of the federal judiciary. It "stands independent" of the other two
branches "to maintain the checks and balances of the constitutional structure, and
[also] to guarantee that the process of adjudication itself remain[s] impartial . . . .
Justice Brennan finds support for this view in the specific language of article
I1,1- the broader structural imperatives of the Constitution,16 and the pre-Revolution-
ary experience with a subservient judiciary.' 7 Nevertheless, there is an element of
sleight of hand in all this. Justice Brennan repeatedly refers to the constitutional
"command"' 8 of an independent judiciary as if it were a command that the federal
judiciary be created in the first place alongside the legislative and executive branches.
There is an apparent parallel among articles I, II, and In. Each article prescribes that
a particular power "shall be vested" in a particular branch. 19 However, article III
gives Congress the choice to create or not create any federal tribunal other than the
Supreme Court. 20 The theory has been advanced that Congress must create a federal
judiciary, but this theory is not widely accepted. 2'
Justice Brennan appears to concede this point in a footnote.2 However, he limits
9. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57-60 (1982).
10. Id. at 63-87.
11. See, e.g., id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (area one of "frequently arcane distinctions and confusing
precedents ...."). Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 534 (1962) (same).
12. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
13. Id. at 818-19. Marshall was, in part, paraphrasing an argument of counsel. He also expressed his strong
agreement with it.
14. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982) (emphasis added).
15. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 1). "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme
court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish."
16. Id. at 57--60.
17. Id. at 59-60.
18. Id. at 58, 62-63.
19. U.S. Cosr art. I, § 1 (legislative power vested in a Congress); U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1 (executive power vested
in a president); U.S. Co.wSr. art. Ii, § I (udicial power vested in one supreme court and such inferior courts as Congress
may create).
20. U.S. Co.s T art. I, § 1, "such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish."
21. See, e.g., C. WwrGHT, LAw OF FDERAL. Corxrs 36-39 (4th ed. 1983).
22. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 n.15 (1982).
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its thrust by countering that "the Framers did not leave it to Congress to define the
character of [federal] courts-they were to be independent of the political bodies and
presided over by judges with guaranteed salary and life tenure.'' 23 Thus Justice
Brennan seems to have reverted to a position one step short of mandatory vesting. To
the extent that Congress vests the judicial power of the United States anywhere, rather
than leave federal matters to state courts, that power "must be exercised by courts
having the attributes prescribed in Art. IR."24 This absolutist25 position is entirely
faithful to the language of article III and perhaps to its spirit. Nevertheless, the
position is difficult to maintain in light of Congress' utilization, and the Court's
acceptance, of a wide variety of non-article III adjudicative bodies. 26 Recognizing
this, Justice Brennan takes another adroit step backwards. Article HI adjudication is
the norm. To be valid, non-article III adjudicative bodies must either fit within a
narrow group of exceptions to this principle27 or operate in such close relationship to
an article I court as to become a subordinate component ("adjunct") of that court.28
The bulk of Justice Brennan's opinion is an elaborate exercise in justifying and
explaining these departures from the posited norm of article Ill adjudication as a
fundamental constitutional value. In each instance he concludes that the bankruptcy
courts do not fit within the exception.
He deals first with Congress' power to provide for resolution of disputes in
tribunals outside of article III, either "legislative courts" or administrative agencies.
Although Congress has done so many times throughout the country's history, valid
use of these tribunals can be reduced to "three narrow situations ... :"9 territorial
courts, including those for the District of Columbia;30 courts-martial;3 1 and tribunals
adjudicating so-called "public rights.' 32 The first and second situations are justified
as flowing from Congress' exercise of an "exceptional" grant of power.3 3 This
rationale should not be extended to the creation of tribunals under the article I
bankruptcy power. To accept this argument would be to ignore the special
circumstances which obtain when Congress acts to govern the territories or to
structure the armed forces. It would also provide no limits on the broad use of article
I power to undermine the principle of article III adjudication, thus threatening the
"erosion" of the judicial branch.3 4 Justice Brennan's analysis of the first two
exceptions is relatively straightforward, although it does depend on the ability to
distinguish between grants of power to Congress which are extraordinary and those
which are not.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 59.
25. For a hypothetical illustration of the absolutist position, see Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts,
56 U. CoLO. L. Rav. 581, 584-85 (1985) [hereinafter Resnik].
26. See, e.g., id. at 586-87.
27. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63-76 (1982).
28. Id. at 76-87.
29. Id. at 64.
30. Id. at 64-65.
31. Id. at 66.
32. Id. at 67-70.
33. Id. at 64, 70.
34. Id. at 74.
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The third situation, the issue of public rights adjudication, is much more
complex. Justice Brennan defines public rights as matters arising between the
government and individuals which could, historically, have been determined outside
the judicial branch. 35 Monetary claims against the government, for example, might
run afoul of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since the government could prevent
their being heard at all, it has a choice of means as to how public rights claims shall
be heard, including their adjudication by non-article H bodies. 36 While the public
rights-private rights line may not always be easy to draw, the contract claim at issue
in Northern Pipeline clearly falls on the latter side. For Justice Brennan, such cases
"lie at the core of the historically recognized judicial power." 37
The notion of a core of article H matters has considerable appeal, and can be
traced to the famous distinction in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co.3 8 between inherently judicial matters, nonjudicial matters, and those which might
or might not be heard by a court. Nevertheless, the public-private dichotomy is beset
with uncertainties. One such uncertainty is distinguishing between the two kinds of
rights. Justice Brennan admits that the presence of the government as a party does not
by itself make a case one of public right.39 Particularly puzzling is his apparent
insistence that the public rights doctrine is triggered only by the exercise of one of
those elusive "exceptional" grants of congressional power. 40 This seems inconsistent
with his recognition that public rights can be created by the exercise of many of the
enumerated powers. 41 Furthermore, the notion of a public right, assuming it is valid
at all, would seem to flow more from a particular government-citizen relationship,
such as a benefit, rather than from the particular congressional power which created
the right. A final puzzlement, with respect to adjudication of public rights, is Justice
Brennan's reintroduction of the article I courts through the suggestion that their
appellate review of such disputes may be constitutionally required, suggesting that
the government's choice of means is not unlimited after all.42 (For matters within the
article Il core, even appellate review is not enough.) 43 In sum, Justice Brennan
himself seems uneasy with the notion of public rights and anxious to confine it.
Confined or not, the doctrine of public rights cannot justify the extensive
adjudicative role played by administrative agencies. Justice Brennan is able to deal
with this role while considering an alternative argument in favor of the bankruptcy
judges, namely, that they are set up as "adjuncts" to the various federal district
courts. 44 He notes that the Court has, indeed, upheld the use of such adjuncts,
including administrative agencies. For him the cases suggest two guidelines: first,
that Congress' power to assign functions to an adjunct is greatest when it has created
35. Id. at 67-68.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 70.
38. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
39. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 n.23 (1982).
40. Id. at 70.
41. Id. at 69 n.22.
42. Id. at 69-70 n.23.
43. Id. at 86-87 n.39.
44. Id. at 76-87.
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the underlying right;45 and second, that any such scheme must not take from the
article III court "the essential attributes" of judicial power. 46
The adjunct argument could be quickly disposed of in Northern Pipeline itself.47
The contract rights in that case arose under state law rather than under a statute
enacted by Congress. Moreover, the bankruptcy courts functioned as the basic
adjudicators of all matters, leaving article III tribunals in an essentially appellate role.
Yet the role of article I tribunals, for Justice Brennan, cannot be so limited. In the
constitutional scheme, article III tribunals are to be the primary adjudicators in all
cases. Their tasks include "the mundane as well as the glamorous, matters of
common law and statute as well as constitutional law, issues of fact as well as issues
of law." 48 Thus the system of bankruptcy courts runs afoul of both guidelines and
represents an encroachment upon the article I judicial power. Once again, however,
Justice Brennan's general analysis raises a number of questions.
As stated, his approach to the use of adjuncts appears to constitute a two-part
inquiry: whether Congress created the right and whether it left the "essential
attributes" intact. It appears that Congress can provide for the use of adjuncts in any
case, but Congress' actions are subject to "stricter scrutiny" when it has not created
the right.49 This sliding scale results in a somewhat awkward use of the concept of
essential attributes. If they really are essential, why should the source of the rights
involved allow a greater or lesser diminution? As with public rights, Justice
Brennan's deference to Congress when it chooses adjudicative mechanisms in
exercising the range of enumerated powers is inevitably in conflict with his vision of
article III adjudication as the norm. With adjuncts, the problem can be finessed to
some extent by viewing them as within the article Ill structure. Even so, the more one
accepts diminution of the essential attributes, as Justice Brennan's sliding scale does,
the closer this view comes to fiction since the adjuncts become an alternative to article
mII tribunals. With all its flaws, however, the Brennan opinion is an ambitious attempt
to synthesize the status of all federal adjudicative bodies in light of the perceived
overriding imperative of fidelity to article M. One must next consider why five of his
colleagues refused to join in the undertaking.
B. Blurring the Vision-Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and Justice O'Connor, concurred in the
judgment but not in the Court's opinion. 50 The views of these two Justices take on
particular significance in that both of them joined the Court's swift retreat from
Northern Pipeline in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.S1 and
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.52 Indeed, Justice O'Connor wrote
45. Id. at 80.
46. Id. at 81.
47. Id. at 81-87.
48. Id. at 86-87 n.39.
49. Id. at 82-83.
50. Id. at 89.
51. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
52. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
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the majority opinion in each case. In part, the position taken by the concurrence rests
on a disagreement with the breadth of the holding in Northern Pipeline. Justice
Rehnquist did not think that the constitutional validity of the entire range of the
bankruptcy courts' authority was properly before the Court.5 3 He was willing to strike
down the statute conferring that authority because, as drafted, the statute was not
severable and because the only federal body which could validly hear the matter at
issue in Northern Pipeline would be an article Im court. That matter is a state-created,
common law contract claim, an example of "the stuff of the traditional actions at
common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789.' 54 Thus he agrees with
Justice Brennan that there is a core of federal judicial power which must remain in
article HI courts. He apparently advocates an historical test as the means of
identifying that core. Justice Rehnquist also expresses agreement with Justice
Brennan that appellate review by an article I court is not enough to satisfy the
Constitution if a particular case is within the core.5 5 The bankruptcy courts had too
much power over cases to be characterized as adjuncts.5 6 Therefore, in Northern
Pipeline, the statute extended beyond constitutional limits because a non-article II
body adjudic'ated a matter which Congress could not assign to it.
The Rehnquist concurrence, if this was all it contained, might be read as
differing from the plurality only over the narrow question of the proper extent of the
constitutional holding, given the facts before the Court. However, Justice Rehnquist
also indicated a willingness to interpret the public rights doctrine broadly to sustain
other, unspecified aspects of the bankruptcy system not before the Court.57 Just how
far he would go in showing deference to Congress' use of non-article III tribunals
cannot be gleaned from this apparent reference to bankruptcy matters arising under
federal law. Even if there is a fairly wide gap between Justices Rehnquist and
Brennan over the scope of the public rights doctrine, the Rehnquist concurrence
seems close to an acceptance of the plurality's general mode of analysis. Justice
Rehnquist, however, asserts that the question remains open.58
Justice White's dissenting opinion59 displays no such ambiguity. For him the
plurality was simply wrong in attempting to erect a rigid analytical structure and
testing the bankruptcy courts against it. Part of this disagreement rests on his view
that the new system of bankruptcy judges was only a marginal extension of the
previous system.60 Bankruptcy referees-the judges' predecessors-were already
handling a wide variety of state law matters: "[T]he great bulk of creditor
claims .... "61 Extending this presumably valid jurisdiction to claims of the
bankrupt against third parties should not trigger constitutional objections. Even if
53. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 89-90 (1982).
54. Id. at 90.
55. Id. at 91.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 92.
60. Id. at 99-100.
61. Id. at 96.
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invalid, only the extension should be struck down, not the entire system of
bankruptcy judges. 62 Since, however, the plurality has escalated the debate to the
general level of what Congress may validly assign to non-article mU courts, Justice
White considers these issues as well. He recognizes the textual and historical support
for the literalist position that any congressionally created entities which exercise the
judicial power as described in article IH must be courts as described in that article. 63
The problem is that the Court has sustained the validity of a wide variety of federal
adjudicative entities which do not fit that description---especially administrative
agencies-and it is no longer possible to "disregard 150 years of history. ... ."64
Justice White surveys the extensive body of precedent and concludes, as others
have, that the cases cannot easily be reconciled, much less reduced to a black letter
test.65 The Court has upheld the use of non-article In courts in so many different
contexts that "there is no difference in principle between the work that Congress may
assign to an [a]rt[icle] I court and that which the Constitution assigns to [a]rt[icle] Im
courts. "66 One cannot escape this conclusion either by recourse to the nature of the
power Congress used to set up the tribunal67 or to distinctions based on the nature of
the business before the tribunal. 68
The latter approach has been a hallmark of several attempts, unsuccessful in
Justice White's view, to fit the article HII precedents into a neat pattem. 69 As for the
former, Justice White disagrees strongly with the plurality's view that some
congressional powers are extraordinary while others are not. 70 This disagreement is
reflected in their differing treatment of Palmore v. United States,7t which upheld the
authority of non-article II courts in the District of Columbia to try federal criminal
cases. The plurality treats Palmore as analogous to Congress' special power over
territories. 72 Justice White views Congress' power over the District of Columbia as
"not different in kind from numerous other legislative responsiblities," 73 although
the relevant quote from Palmore might be read either way. 74
62. Id. at 100.
63. Id. at 92-93.
64. Id. at 93.
65. Id. at 93.
66. Id. at 113.
67. Id. at 104.
68. Id. at 113.
69. Id. at 105-13.
70. Id. at 114. (Power over District of Columbia "not different in kind from numerous other legislative
responsibilities.").
71. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
72. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 75-76 (1982).
73. Id. at 114.
74. The Palmore opinion, written by Justice White, stated that "the requirements of [a]rt[icle] III, which are
applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in proper circumstances
give way to accomodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having
particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment." Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407-08 (1973). In
Northern Pipeline Justice White apparently reads "areas" as referring to subject matter areas, not geographical areas, and
reads it as applicable to all article I enumerated powers, despite the qualifying reference to "laws of national applicability,
etc." However, earlier in Palmore, White treated the District of Columbia as a "subject" Congress could deal with in
ways which would otherwise exceed its powers. Id. at 397-98.
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Justice White is also unwilling to treat the adjunct cases as creating a broad
domain which is saved only by being within article 1H.75 He views Crowell v.
Benson76 as upholding the "use of an art[icle] I adjudicative mechanism"77-an
administrative agency which handled private claims-both because it dealt primarily
with matters of fact and because article I appellate review was available. Moreover,
his statement that the adjunct cases do not establish any "outer limits of constitutional
authority" 78 suggests that such entities can be given more power to the point of
obliterating any distinction between them and other non-article mH adjudicators.
Once Justice White has demolished the plurality's structure, the question arises
of what he would put in its place. At times he appears to say that anything goes, that
Congress can assign whatever it wants to non-article III courts. 79 However, he
ultimately eschews total deference to Congress, and insists that "[a]rticle H is not to
be read out of the Constitution. . . ."80 The answer is a form of balancing test: the
values expressed (or "furthered") by article III "must be balanced against competing
constitutional values and legislative responsibilities.' '81 The Court is, in reality, to
measure twice. First, it must determine the extent of legislative accomodation or
undermining of the article I values. Second, it must measure any burden on them
"against the values Congress hopes to serve through the use of [a]rt[icle] I courts. "82
The second step suggests that Congress could win every time since there is no
absolute barrier if its "values" are strong enough.
The fact that Congress nearly always provides for appellate review apparently
saves Justice White from contemplating any such dire consequences. 8 3 Appellate
review protects what he views as the major article HI value: the presence of a court
to enforce constitutional limits on the political branches. 84 Any additional interest
attached to independent adjudication may flow from the due process clause rather
than directly from article 1H.8-5 This interest is not threatened if the matters in question
are unlikely to be of concern to the political branches. The use of bankruptcy judges
threatens neither value, and reflects a compelling need for congressional action.
Thus, the plurality was wrong in approach and wrong in result.
In sum, Northern Pipeline shows deep divisions within the Court over how to
approach the question of article III limits on congressional power. In part, the
differences are in the realm of doctrine and methodology. In part, they reflect
differing assessments of impact-how often a given approach would strike down
congressional arrangements and whether such outcomes are desirable. Beneath these
75. He seems to view the majority's adjunct analysis as representing the general issue of constitutional limits on
Congress' power to go outside article III, although he does not deal with it extensively. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co.
v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 94, 100-03 (1982).
76. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
77. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 109 (1982).
78. Id. at 101.
79. E.g., id. at 105, 113.
80. Id. at 113.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 115.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 115-16.
85. Id. at 117.
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differences there may lie an even more important one: contrasting views about the
role and importance of article I courts, particularly as initial adjudicators.
C. The Northern Pipeline Doctrine-Weaknesses and Strengths
Northern Pipeline has been sharply criticized, even by those sympathetic with
what Justice Brennan was trying to do.86 Because of these criticisms, and because of
the Court's apparent second thoughts about Northern Pipeline, this article will first
consider the decision's weaknesses as impediments to Northern Pipeline's develop-
ment as a precedent of generative force.
On the doctrinal level, Justice Brennan's opinion is shaky in several respects,
some of which have been noted above. 87 Its heavy reliance on the public-private
rights distinction is an oft-cited weak spot.88 The distinction made sense under the
common law view of the world represented by Murray's Lessee. But in a world of
statutorily created rights and benefits the line is less clear. Relationships between
individuals and the state can represent forms of property as important as any private
interest which the common law protected. 89 If article I adjudication is an important
means of protecting vital private interests-which seems to be a major premise of
Justice Brennan's opinion-then it ought to be available for many public rights,
especially since the government is a party to any dispute. The salary and tenure
guarantees of article I ensure that the government is not judge of its own cause.90
Another doctrinal weakness is the notion that the particular power Congress has
utilized can guide the Court's decision whether to accept use of a non-article I
mechanism. Trying to differentiate extraordinary powers from those that are not is
nearly an impossible task, as Justice Brennan's opinion demonstrates. On the one
hand, he attempts to confine the cases upholding territorial courts and courts martial
to the extraordinary powers category. 91 On the other hand, he treats the public rights
doctrine as also related to "exceptional" grants of power, but lists as examples those
relating to commerce, taxation, immigration, and the post office. 92 Obviously he
does not wish to treat all article I powers alike since that would provide no limiting
principle to the use of non-article I courts. 93 But in a sense all of Congress' powers
are extraordinary in that they represent the domain of a government limited in scope
but supreme within that domain. In this respect it is useful to consider the Court's
approach in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.94 Garcia
involved the question of federalism-based limits on congressional authority, a
86. E.g., Redish, supra note 4; Resnik, supra note 25.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 5-11.
88. E.g., Resnik, supra note 25, at 600; The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HIev. L. REv. 62, 262-65 (1982).
89. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
90. Justice Brennan appears to accept this argument. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 68 n.20 (1982); see also Resnik, supra note 25, at 600.
91. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64, 67 (1982).
92. Id. at 70.
93. Id. at 73.
94. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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structural issue similar in many ways to that of the limits imposed by article 111.95
Garcia appears to reject any notion that federalism constraints vary in strength
depending on the power used. All powers of the national government are of an
apparently equal status. 96
As a matter of methodology, the Northern Pipeline plurality opinion points
toward a literal application of article III, but pulls back to the notion of a
constitutionally protected "core" of judicial power. If article III limited adjudication
of core matters to tribunals constituted in a certain way then a bright line test would
still be possible. But because the Court has allowed such adjudications outside article
III Justice Brennan is forced into his elaborate schema of exceptions and adjuncts. Of
course, he is compelled to backtrack in order to save adjudication by administrative
agencies. Administrative agencies, however, do considerably more than handle
public rights disputes, and it is very hard to think of them as mere adjuncts of article
I courts. If anything, the relationship is the other way around, given courts'
deference to agency decisions in the realm of law as well as fact. For all these reasons
the emergence of a Northern Pipeline doctrine significantly limiting congressional
power to choose the means of adjudication might have seemed remote, even without
the advantage of hindsight.
Such weaknesses are not surprising, however, in a decision which attempts to
break new ground and break with a past of almost total deference to Congress. 97
Opinions which attempt to change the law may well have difficulty in altering
existing precedent to fit a new mold. It is possible to view Justice Brennan as seeking
a restoration of article I limits along the lines which the framers envisaged. One can
even treat his opinion as analogous to that of Justice Rehnquist in National League
of Cities v. Usery,98 also an attempt to re-establish limits. 99 The great strength of the
Brennan opinion lies in its effort to block any further erosion of the role of article III
courts as the adjudicative arm of the national government. Thus, a Northern Pipeline
doctrine would utilize the notion of core judicial matters to require that certain
adjudications take place at all stages in article I courts or their adjuncts.
95. See, e.g., Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions-A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 Coss .N L. REv. 488, 513-14 (1987). [hereinafter Strauss, Formal and Functional].
96. Thus the Garcia majority stated that "the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that
inherent in all congressional action---the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal
governmental action." Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1982) (emphasis added).
However, the notion that some powers are more plenary than others, in terms of constitutional restraints upon them, is a
recurring one. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (in exercise of fourteenth amendment powers
Congress may abrogate states' eleventh amendment protections). See also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973)
(discussing Congress' authority over the District of Columbia under which it can deal with subjects which would otherwise
exceed its powers). Justice Brennan recently argued, in dissent, that Congress' extensive power over military affairs
should not preclude aBivens action any more than should its other article I powers. United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct.
3054, 3066, 3077 (1987).
97. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 Hsv. L. REv. 62, 257 (1982) (Northern Pipeline was the first
instance in which the Supreme Court limited congressional authority to assign adjudicative authority to legislative
tribunals).
98. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
99. National League of Cities utilized the concept of attributes of state sovereignty as a check on Congress. There
are obvious similarities between this approach and one that relies on a notion of core judicial authority or essential
attributes of judicial power. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 25, at 602-03.
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What, after all, are the alternatives to some form of Northern Pipeline doctrine?
One might-as seems to be the case with federalism-based limits after Garcia-
abandon any attempted constraint and leave the choice of adjudicative mechanisms
entirely to Congress.100 Alternatively, one could take the position that the availability
of appellate review in an article II court always satisfies that constitutional provision.
Beyond these positions, there is the possibility of case by case balancing, although it
is difficult to articulate a formulation under which Congress' choice of adjudicative
mechanism would ever be overturned. Strong legislative interest can always be found
in whatever underlying program is involved. Justice Brennan's approach, however
tentative, does go further.
Thus Northern Pipeline emerges as a first cut, with the inevitable flaws and false
starts. Whether a Northern Pipeline doctrine ultimately takes hold will depend on
how much importance article I adjudication enjoys in the constitutional scheme. A
preliminary question is whether it protects individual or structural interests. 10' Justice
Brennan never addresses this question directly. Apart from a reference to the role of
consent, 0 2 his opinion focuses on structure. 0 3 If article H, however, does protect
both kinds of interests that would underscore the importance of a Northern Pipeline
doctrine. If one takes the view that the primary role ofjudicial review is the protection
of individual rights, 1°4 the case for a strict approach seems particularly strong at first
blush. However, the question again arises why appellate review is not sufficient to
provide that protection. As for the initial stage, it is not hard to view the independent
adjudication to which Justice Brennan refers as an individual litigant's right. The
right to an article I court, however, may not come from article I itself; it is the due
process clause to which one looks for the guarantee of fairness in governmental
decisionmaking.105 If the only fair forum is a judicial one, the due process clause
should be sufficient to command that result. If due process is satisfied it is hard to see,
from the individual litigant's point of view, what article III adds. There may be
claims, such as constitutional issues, which require a judicial forum at some point.10 6
In these cases, it seems to be the structural value of preserving the courts' role as final
interpreters of the Constitution which predominates as far as article III is concerned.
Structural provisions may, of course, further the enhancement of individual
rights and liberties. One example is the Constitution's retention of a federal system.
The presence of states as competing sovereigns helps achieve this end by furnishing
100. See Strauss, Formal and Functional, supra note 95, at 491-92, 514.
101. See, e.g., Note, Federal Magistrates and the Principles of Article 111, 97 Hi Rv. L. Ray. 1947, 1952-54 (1984)
[hereinafter Harvard Magistrate Note].
102. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79-80 n.31 (1982).
103. E.g., id. at 57-60.
104. See generally J. CHOPER, JuOiaAL Rvmw maD m NAno1AL PoumcA. PRocEss (1980).
105. See, e.g., Harvard Magistrate Note, supra note 101, at 1953; Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 117 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). But see Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial
Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 Gao. L.J. 297, 306-07 (1981) [hereinafter
Krattenmakerl (due process guarantee of fairness "does not protect the full range of values sheltered by article Ill").
Having in place a judiciary which incorporates such values as "the appearance of fairness," independence and integrity
may benefit society at large, including those citizens who do not actually use it. Id. at 306. However, adjudicative
mechanisms which satisfy due process considerations may also incorporate these values and provide the same benefit.
106. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 4, at 224-26.
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alternative systems of protection, as well as by providing a range of opportunities for
individual self-realization. 10 7 Similarly, separation of powers serves to prevent
aggrandizement of the political branches and preserves the goal of limited govern-
ment. As far as the courts are concerned, this is done primarily through their role as
enforcers of the Constitution. The debate over Northern Pipeline, however, is not
over the federal courts' power to pass on constitutional questions at some point; the
key question is whether preserving a role for article III courts as initial adjudicators
is of constitutional significance.
For Justice Brennan, the answer is yes. A satisfactory defense of this position
may require something more than reliance on the intent of the framers. A possible
general justification is that to be truly effective the national judiciary must be seen as
the primary federal dispute resolution mechanism, and that this perception requires
involvement in a significant number of cases at every stage of adjudication. The
colloquial expression "making a federal case" out of something captures and
reflects this perception. To stand up to the political branches as an equal, the federal
judiciary must, in its own right, be playing an equally important role in the day to
day business of government. The Northern Pipeline doctrine guards against a
gradual erosion of this position.
The quintessential example of standing up to the political branches (those of the
states as well as the national government) is the striking down of government action
as violative of the Constitution. 08 As Professor Resnik points out, it is often stated
that the salary and tenure guarantees of article III ensure the courts' ability to perform
this checking function. 109 She suggests the Court's desire to prevent the erosion of
article Ell, illustrated by its decision in Northern Pipeline, rests upon "a deep-seated
myth about the role of judges.""10 She invokes the tale of Lord Coke deciding against
the claimant favored by the King and argues that "the Court provides article IH
judges with the capacity to review executive and congressional action in a diverse set
of arenas and to enforce decisions at odds with the 'King."""l The concept of
decisions that displease the King may go beyond constitutional review, although it
certainly includes such review. Nevertheless, there remains the question of why
appellate review could not perform this function, and why the core of judicial power
must, according to Justice Brennan, include matters such as state-created rights and
admiralty matters. " 2 Deferential appellate review may not be enough when the lower
tribunal is in a position to shape a case or is inherently biased in one direction." 3 But
107. See, e.g., Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. Cr.
REv. 81, 108-09.
108. This may be done either to enforce structural limitations or guarantees of individual rights.
109. Resnik, supra note 25, at 588. As she points out, these guarantees are also thought to preserve independent
adjudication.
110. Id. at 611.
Ill. Id. at 612.
112. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70-71 n.25 (1982).
113. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 25, at 600-01 (possibility of agency loyalty to statutory schemes), 616 (ability
of first tier decisionmakers to shape cases); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85-86
n.39 (1982).
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why should the irreducible core of article HI include matters most unlikely to
displease the King? 14
A possible, and complementary, answer lies in the courts' general role as dispute
resolvers. Throughout our national history the Supreme Court has stressed that
judicial review is legitimate only because it is a necessary part of dispute resolution.
The famous quote from Chief Justice Marshall that "it is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is..." 115 is followed by this
sentence: "Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule." 116 It is the judiciary's role as decider of "particular cases"
that legitimizes this specific, ultimate power. Northern Pipeline is aimed at
preserving that broader role.
As a functional matter, it may also be important not to elevate the federal
judiciary to the distant level of appellate review only. Viewed as a single institution,
Justice Brennan seems to be saying, the federal judiciary draws its strength from
experience with all facets of cases and a variety of subject matters. Closely related to
this argument is the view that the generalist nature of the federal courts is a source of
their strength and prestige." 7 That nature is at risk if Congress can continually
syphon off matters.
An additional point in favor of the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline is its
relative fidelity to the wording of article I. Even if absolutism is not possible,
adherence to the constitutional text is an important value in and of itself. This seems
particularly true in the case of the document's structural provisions.118 These are
designed to provide an institutional framework within which government performs.
That performance may vary and may include the protection of rights established
elsewhere in the Constitution's "open-ended" provisions. However, the structure
provides a set of known and agreed upon rules which can and ought to remain
constant, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy and acceptability of changing outcomes.
There is, finally, the important matter of the spirit of article I, and in particular
the Madisonian compromise which gave Congress the choice whether or not to create
a system of lower federal courts, including the decision of the extent of those courts'
authority. Federalism concerns might cause Congress to leave virtually everything to
the state courts. Nationalism concerns, such as those which prevailed after the Civil
War, point in the other direction. Extensive use of non-article III adjudicative bodies
allows Congress to finesse the Madisonian compromise by sidestepping both the state
and the federal courts. The states lose their role as primary adjudicators of disputes,
but not in favor of the constitutionally prescribed alternative - article IH courts." 9
114. Professor Resnik blunts this objection to some extent by including within the category of decisions potentially
displeasing to the King those involving "major social policy issues. ... Resnik, supra note 25, at 615. However,
Justice Brennan's notion of core judicial matters goes considerably further.
115. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
116. Id.
117. See Resnik, supra note 25, at 600-01.
118. See, e.g., National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646-47 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Krattenmaker, supra note 105, at 311.
119. An argument along these lines was advanced in Schor, but was rather summarily dismissed by the Court.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3261-62 (1986).
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Of course, literalism and fidelity to constitutional history sometimes collide with the
perceived exigencies of modem government. Such a collision may have stopped the
Northern Pipeline doctrine in its tracks.
II. SECOND THOUGHTS-THE HASTY RETREAT FROM NORTHERN PIPELI
A. Thomas-Deference to Congressional Choice of Adjudicative Methods
Litigants and judges saw at once that Northern Pipeline might require striking
down a range of non-article III adjudication schemes. The lower courts showed some
receptivity to these arguments. 120 The law appeared to be in the early stages of
development after a landmark case has broken new but uncertain ground; much would
hinge on clarification and elucidation from the Supreme Court. Three years after
Northern Pipeline, the Court spoke in very ambiguous tones, casting some doubt on
that case's status as the source of a new doctrine.
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. 121 was a challenge to a
scheme of mandatory arbitration with limited judicial review. This scheme is part of
the complex system for regulating pesticides. 122 Manufacturers must register pesti-
cides with the Environmental Protection Agency, and must support the application
with relevant data. Problems had arisen when later applications were based in part on
data previously submitted by another manufacturer. Congress determined that the
original submitter should receive compensation for such "follow-on" use. However,
the E.P.A. found the task of determining the value of data so time consuming that the
entire system became seriously bogged down. In response, Congress created the
arbitration scheme, under which, for certain pesticides, 123 either applicant can request
binding arbitration if there is no agreement between them as to the amount of
compensation. A court can review the arbitrator's decision only for "fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct." Several pesticide manufacturers challenged
the scheme on various grounds. Relying on Northern Pipeline, the district court
invalidated the mandatory arbitration scheme. 124
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion is a curious
blend of the contrasting analyses offered by the Northern Pipeline plurality and
dissent. The precise holding in Northern Pipeline is not an obstacle to the arbitration
scheme's validity, since Northern Pipeline involved adjudication of state law
matters.' 2 5 The relationships among pesticide data submitters are governed by federal
law. The question is whether the matters the arbitrator will decide constitute a private
right or a public right.'2 6 Admittedly the dispute is between two private parties;
120. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 576 (1985).
121. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
122. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, & Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136. See generally Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571-74 (1985).
123. For data submitted after September 30, 1978 the submitter was given a ten year period of exclusive use during
which the data could not be utilized by anyone else without the original submitter's permission.
124. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 576-78 (1985).
125. Id. at 584.
126. Id. at 585-89.
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nevertheless, Justice O'Connor finds that the underlying issues are more like a public
right. The whole dispute arises out of a congressionally created regulatory scheme,
and Congress could have assigned any compensation issues to the agency in order to
"allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the program without
providing an [a]rticle IH adjudication." 1 27
Use of the public rights doctrine sounds like Northern Pipeline. But Justice
O'Connor turns it into a form of balancing that combines Justice White's dissenting
approach with Justice Brennan's test for the use of adjuncts. The two principal
variables are "the origin of the right at issue . . . [and] the concerns guiding the
selection by Congress of a particular method for resolving disputes." ' 128 The fact that
the compensation dispute does not arise directly between the government and the
manufacturers is not determinative. The matter became one of public right because
Congress created the right-as opposed to replacing a state law cause of action or
controlling its adjudication-and because it was part of a complex regulatory scheme
which was on the verge of breaking down.
At first it appears that this sliding scale operates subject to an ultimate
requirement of some "degree of judicial involvement .... "129 However, Justice
O'Connor later states that "the requirements of [a]rt[icle] In must in proper
circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to
legislate with respect to specialized areas." 130 This statement-a summary of the
holding in Palmore v. United States131-is ambiguous in its possible limitation to
some subject areas. However, the reference to "proper circumstances" suggests that
a sufficiently strong congressional interest will always win in terms of the placement
of initial adjudication. This type of balancing is very close to what Justice White
advocated in Northern Pipeline.132 Like Justice White, Justice O'Connor places
reliance on the limited availability of article II appellate review to satisfy the article
1m values. As she interprets the statute, questions involving the Constitution and the
arbitrator's power under "the governing law" will come before a court. 133
Thus, the seemingly a priori notion of public rights has been infused with
considerable flexibility. The entire tone of Justice O'Connor's opinion is certainly
closer to the Northern Pipeline dissent than to the plurality opinion. Although article
II protects important values, "[a]n absolute construction of... [it] is not
possible .... -134 The routine practice of administrative adjudication reflects the
Court's substantial deference to Congress. Of particular importance is her implicit
criticism of Northern Pipeline in the rejection of any "bright line" test and the call
for "practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal
127. Id. at 589.
128. Id. at 587.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 590-91.
131. 411 U.S. 389 (1973). See supra text accompanying note 74.
132. See M. RDmIsH, FEDERA. Coun, 1986 Stn.tussrr 83 (asking whether the Thomas Court has adopted Justice
White's test).
133. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592 (1985).
134. Id. at 583.
[Vol. 49:55
NORTHERN PIPELINE
categories ... . ''135 As a methodological matter, it is precisely such rigidity that
makes a Northern Pipeline doctrine, at least one with impact, possible.
Justice Brennan, thus, found himself in something of a dilemma, which he
resolved temporarily by concurring in the Thomas judgment. 136 His opinion insists
that the public rights doctrine, as enunciated in Northern Pipeline, is the correct
approach, and that on these facts it leads to upholding the statute. He describes the
public rights doctrine as a flexible standard which allows Congress leeway in
structuring adjudicative mechanisms. He demonstrates that flexibility by reasoning
that the concept of disputes "between the government and others"' 137 is really quite
a broad one: it extends to "disputes arising from the federal government's
administration of its laws or programs."' 138 The identity of the parties is not the key;
the relationship of the government to the dispute is. In Thomas, the government is
heavily involved. Justice Brennan even treats the arbitration as part of the overall
administrative process for regulating pesticides.139
Thus redefined, the public rights approach places in this category a wide
spectrum of federally created rights and duties between private parties which flow
from the use of administrative agencies to handle particular subject matters. The
danger of tautology is obvious. Public rights cases are those which arise "in the
administration of federal regulatory programs," 140 and what administrative agencies
may adjudicate is determined by the presence of public rights.
Despite his insistence on flexibility, Justice Brennan does not portray the public
rights doctrine as toothless. Instead, he suggests that the availability of appellate
review satisfies the dictates of article I when public rights are involved. 141 This is
a shift in focus from the general adjudicatory role of article Ill courts to their
"checking" function. 142 It is this checking function which keeps the political
branches from overstepping their bounds. Justice Brennan's double retreat permits
him to treat Northern Pipeline as alive and well, and the majority at least pays it lip
service. One year later, the Court came a step closer to outright repudiation.
B. Schor-Administrative Adjudication of "Core" Judicial Matters
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor'43 was another case in which
the lower court relied on Northern Pipeline to restrict non-article III adjudication. At
issue was the Commission's authority to hear state law counterclaims by brokers
when customers brought claims before it to redress violations of the Commodity
Exchange Act or Commission regulations. Congress had provided this administrative
135. Id. at 587.
136. Id. at 594.
137. Id. at 597 (quoting Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982)).
138. Id. at 596.
139. Id. at 599.
140. Id. at 596 n.1.
141. Id. at 599.
142. Compare id. at 594, 599 (importance of checking function) with Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50, 86 n.39
(function of judiciary not limited to keeping "the other two Branches in check .... .
143. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
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reparations procedure to give aggrieved customers an expeditious alternative to
judicial resolution of their claims. The Commission had added the counterclaim
procedure by regulation. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that because Northern Pipeline cast serious constitutional doubt on jurisdiction
over state law counterclaims, the statute authorizing the reparations procedure should
not be construed to authorize the counterclaim regulation.144 By a margin of seven to
two, the Supreme Court reversed. 45 In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court
held that Congress had authorized the counterclaim jurisdiction, and that article II
did not prevent it from doing so.
The opinion, like that of Justice Brennan in Northern Pipeline, is an attempt to
reformulate the constraints which article III imposes on Congress, based on an
assessment of article III's role in the constitutional scheme. Justice O'Connor views
article III as protecting both the structural value of separation of powers and the
individual's right to impartial and independent adjudication.46 For her, the latter is
article HI's primary function. 47 Such personal rights can, however, be waived, and
the customer in Schor had done so.' 48 He had initiated the administrative proceeding
with full knowledge of the counterclaim possibility, and had urged dismissal of a suit
by the broker presenting this claim on the ground it could be heard before the agency.
But his consent could not obviate the need to consider the bearing of article III as a
structural imperative. 149 The relevant structural principle is that of separation of
powers/checks and balances: preventing "the encroachment or aggrandizement of
one branch at the expense of the other."1 50 Congress cannot act to "emasculate" the
judicial branch.' 5' These statements are not a radical departure from anything said in
Northern Pipeline.
What is new is Justice O'Connor's reformulation of the "pragmatic" approach
she had espoused in Thomas. She now identifies three factors as the primary guides
to determine whether Congress could "authorize the adjudication of [a]rticle I
business in a non-[a]rticle III tribunal .... "152 These are, first, "the extent to
which the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are reserved to [a]rticle HI courts;"
second, "the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated;" and third, "the
concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of [aIrticle .,"153
(The second and third factors appeared in Thomas as a guide for identifying public
rights.) This three factor test is obviously very malleable. The third factor incorpo-
rates the deference to Congress inherent in Justice White's balancing approach. The
144. 770 F.2d 211 (1985).
145. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
146. d. at 3256.
147. Id. The guarantee of independent and impartial adjudication by the federal judiciary "serves to protect
primarily personal rather than structural interests."
148. Id. at 3256-57.
149. Id. at 3257-58.
150. Id. at 3257 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 122 (1976)).
151. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S.,Ct. 3245, 3257 (1986) (quoting National Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 644 (1946) (dissenting opinion)).
152. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3258 (1986).
153. Id. These factors are presented as a guide to the ultimate question of "the practical effect that the congressional
action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary." No other factors are mentioned.
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first and second factors, although ambiguous, suggest elements of a core or zone
approach that can impose definite constraints. As applied by Justice O'Connor in
Schor, however, this "pragmatic" test is one which Congress will almost always
win, at least if it has provided appellate review in an article III court.
The first factor is, she states, easily satisfied because the Commission's powers
are basically an example of "the traditional agency model .... ,1 54 The one
difference is the counterclaim jurisdiction, but this does not alter the role which
article I11 courts play vis-h-vis the agency. If a party does not comply with an order,
that noncompliance triggers a judicial proceeding for enforcement, which proceeding
utilizes the weight of the evidence standard for issues of fact and de novo review for
questions of law. 155 In addition to the availability of judicial review, the Commis-
sion's counterclaim jurisdiction adheres to the agency model because it has a limited
subject matter area-violations of the Commodity Exchange Act-as opposed to the
broad jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts in Northern Pipeline.156 In other words,
invocation of the agency model seems to validate any assignment of matters to a
specialized non-article IlI-body as long as there is some appellate review, no matter
how deferential. (Justice O'Connor had earlier stated that the agency's expertise is
"superior to that of a court" in construing the agency's own statute.) 157 So much for
the first factor.
The second factor-restated as "the nature of the claim" ' 58-might have been
expected to be more troublesome. The broker's private state law claim for its
commissions seems on a par with the contract claim in Northern Pipeline, part of the
core of article mH judicial power. However, Justice O'Connor first insists that Thomas
rejected any notion that the distinction between public and private rights should be
determinative of congressional power.' 5 9 (One can only wonder why her opinion in
that case went to some lengths to apply the distinction.) Similarly, she argues the
distinction between state law and other claims should not be "talismanic.' '160 The
answer to questions of Congress' power is not to be found in any notion of core article
I matters, but through examination of separation of powers concerns. 161 The Court
must inquire whether Congress has improperly encroached on the judicial branch.
There is a greater risk of this encroachment when Congress has removed from article
HI adjudication a traditional common law matter. Thus a stricter scrutiny is called for,
as Justice Brennan had said in dealing with adjuncts. (In this context, however, he
was dealing with whether essential attributes of judicial power had been retained.) In
this case, there is no threat to the separation of powers. The jurisdiction over state law
matters is an incident of the agency's general, valid power over commodity related
154. Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3258 (1986).
155. Id. at 3259.
156. Id. at 3258-60.
157. Id. at 3255.
158. Id. at 3259.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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matters, and there is some judicial control. 162 Thus the subject matter really does not
make much more difference than the mode of adjudication. Finally, Justice O'Connor
suggests that any threat to the separation of powers is further tempered by the fact that
the party with the state law claim retained the option of bringing it before a court,
although it would seem that federal court jurisdiction would require diversity of
citizenship. 163
Even before considering the third factor, one is forced to ask whether Northern
Pipeline would have any bite left. Justice O'Connor invokes it by raising the
following hypothetical possibility: creation by Congress of "a phalanx of non-
[a]rticle mII tribunals equipped to handle the entire business of the [a]rticle I courts
without any [a]rticle II supervision or control and without evidence of valid and
specific legislative necessities . . ." under which litigants would retain the option of
recourse to courts. 164 Such a scheme would be questionable, she suggests. Again,
however, appellate review might save it, given the reference to supervision and
control.
The reference to legislative necessities shows that the third Schor factor-the
concerns that drove Congress to depart from article III-has potentially great reach.
As the analysis in Schor shows, Congress can seemingly always justify its use of
non-article III tribunals by showing some programatic need. In applying the third
factor Justice O'Connor cites agency expertise and the need to make the reparations
scheme effective and workable. 165 Such concerns will always be present.
In sum, it is likely that in any individual case the three factor test will tilt decisively
toward Congress, much like Justice White's balancing approach which it closely
resembles. Responding to Justice Brennan, Justice O'Connor argues that prophylactic
concerns do not require a stricter approach;16 6 the test as formulated can prevent
erosion of the judicial branch. In a potentially significant passage she notes that
mechanisms similar to those in Schor do not constitute aggrandizement of Congress'
power at the judiciary's expense.167 The only question is whether the judicial role has
been undermined. The clear implication is that such a dilution, by itself, does not
greatly threaten the separation of powers or anything else in the Constitution.
All of this was too much for Justice Brennan who, joined by Justice Marshall,
dissented. 168 He agreed generally with the majority about the twin goals of article
IfI-preservation of separation of powers/checks and balances and the protection of
individual litigants' rights. 169 His disagreement on how to achieve these goals can be
summarized in four key points.
162. Id. at 3260.
163. Justice O'Connor states that "the power of the judiciary to take jurisdiction of these matters is unaffected."
Id. The broker's claim for commissions due would seem, however, to arise under state law, thus alleviating possible
general federal question jurisidiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
164. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3260 (1986).
165. Id. at 3254, 3260.
166. Id. at 3261.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 3262.
169. Id. at 3262-63. Justice Brennan treats the two sets of interests as "inseparable" and "coextensive." Thus any
waiver or consent to non-article In adjudication, such as that by the Schor plaintiff, is "irrelevant to [a]rticle EE[ analysis."
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First, the danger to be avoided is erosion of article m. 170 This is likely to occur
on a gradual basis rather than in one fell swoop. Thus, the Court must take a
prophylactic approach. A case by case treatment presents serious dangers of dilution
since the threat in any particular congressional scheme will be slight.
The proper analytical framework is one which relies on a core approach such as
that utilized in Northern Pipeline.17 1 This core is best preserved by adhering to the
presumption in favor of article ILL adjudication and treating the exceptions which
Northern Pipeline recognized as narrow ones. The Court should hold the line rather
than "extend further these exceptions to situations that are distinguishable from
existing precedents."' 172
The majority's alternative approach, essentially based on balancing notions, is
fraught with danger of erosion. 173 Introducing the weight of the legislative interest as
a variable to be considered in each case tilts the balance in Congress' favor: "The
Court pits an interest the benefits of which are immediate, concrete, and easily
understood against one, the benefits of which are almost entirely prophylactic, and
thus often seem remote and not worth the cost in any single case."' 174
Finally, Justice Brennan integrates consideration of the article IlI cases with the
Court's other recent separation of powers decisions.175 His is the first opinion in the
Northern Pipeline-Thomas-Schor trilogy to do so. 176 Both the tone and the result in
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha177 (the legislative veto case) and
Bowsher v. Synar178 (the Balanced Budget Act case) cut in his favor. The Court in
those cases, relying on a formalistic approach to separation of powers, struck down
mechanisms for governmental convenience in favor of the framers' choice of
processes that today "often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable. . .. "179
According to Justice Brennan, the Court should take the same approach in article HI
separation of powers cases. The fact that he dissented and the content of his opinion
raise the question of whether Northern Pipeline is still good law, let alone the
foundation of a major new doctrine.
C. What's Left of Northern Pipeline?
The Court has not overruled Northern Pipeline. Distinctions between it and the
subsequent cases are of course possible, even if tenuous. One important difference for
Justice O'Connor is that the bankruptcy judges handled a wider range of matters than
the Thomas arbitrator or the Schor Commission.' 80 Nevertheless, it is possible to
characterize the bankruptcy judges as also limited to a specialized area: bankruptcy
170. Id. at 3263, 3265-66.
171. Id. at 3263-64.
172. Id. at 3263.
173. Id. at 3264.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 3264-65.
176. Many commentators have done so. E.g., Strauss, Formal and Functional, supra note 95, at 496-510.
177. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
178. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
179. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
180. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3258 (1986).
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matters. 181 The relationships between the initial adjudicator and the article ImI
reviewing court do not seem all that different in the three cases. A high degree of
deference on matters of fact and law is likely; the key determinations will be those
made at the initial, non-article ITm level. One obvious distinction is that Thomas and
Schor involved administrative agencies, while Northern Pipeline did not. This is
important, not because of anything in the appellate court-initial adjudicator relation-
ship, but because adjudication is only one part of the agency's programmatic
responsibilities. (In Thomas the arbitrator, not the agency, performed the adjudication
but his work was closely related to the agency's registration responsibilities.) The
Court defers, then, not only to Congress' specific choice of an adjudicatory
mechanism but to the spectrum of choices it has made about how to regulate the entire
subject.
Still, the question arises as to why the Court did not overrule Northern Pipeline.
Perhaps it did the functional equivalent by replacing the Northern Pipeline analysis
with one which will always come out the other way-in favor of the congressional
choice. This is what initially happened in National League of Cities v. Usery.18 2 That
case delineated an apparent core of state sovereignty which Congress could not
invade, except in the exercise of fourteenth amendment powers. 183 Although its
precise methodology was not easy to formulate, National League of Cities appeared
to have bite: the potential to strike down acts of Congress. Rather than overrule it,
initially at least, the Court reformulated the National League of Cities approach into
an elaborate multifactor test, with a balancing component, which the states could
never win. 184 Justice O'Connor's three factor approach articulated in Schor appears
to produce the same result. Appellate review pretty much provides the essentials of
the judicial power. Since even state created rights can satisfy the scrutiny given to
non-article III tribunals, such adjudication of federally created rights seems to be
home free. Finally, the need to respect Congress' ability to respond to programatic
imperatives will override any lingering obstacles.
Northern Pipeline's continuing force may turn largely on the importance the
Court attaches to the use of article III courts as initial adjudicators at least some of the
time. Justice O'Connor cites the need for impartial and independent adjudication as
an article III value. The due process clause may adequately protect the individual
rights in question without recourse to article III. More to the point, Congress is not
likely to use mechanisms which threaten these rights. It is hard to point to any form
of political domination, even potential, over the adjudication in any of the three
181. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 117-18 (1982) (White, J.,
dissenting) (treating bankruptcy courts as "specialized" courts).
182. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
183. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
184. Hodel v. Virginia State Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 and n.29. Under Hodel
a state challenge to federal commerce power legislation must meet each of three requirements: first, the statute must
regulate the "states as states;" second, the federal activity must address matters that are indisputably "attributes of state
sovereignty;" third, states' compliance would have to directly impair their ability to "structure integral operations in the
area of national governmental function." To these requirements the Court added an apparent balancing test. A state
challenge might meet them and still fail in "situations in which the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such
that it justifies state submission."
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cases. The arbitrators came from a list, 18 and the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission was designed to be immune from political pressure. 186 Indeed, the
general judicialization of the administrative process furthers independent and
impartial adjudication. It is true that bankruptcy judges were appointed for terms of
years, and their salaries could be diminished. 187 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these
factors would have a bearing on a particular case. There may be specific cases where
the initial adjudicator can so shape the dispute as to frustrate meaningful appellate
review, 18 8 but it would seem that enforcing the Constitution through appellate review
will generally be effective in preventing aggrandizement or other wrongdoing by the
political branches.18 9 Without some further justification for its emphasis on the initial
role of article III courts, such as those suggested above,190 Northern Pipeline loses
much of its force. Other factors may, however, be at work in the Court's
downgrading of Northern Pipeline.
Im. THE RETREAT IN CONTrax-SEPARATION OF POWERS ANALYsis AND BURGER
COURT ATrrrUDs TOwARD ARTICLE I COURTS
To the extent there ever was a Northern Pipeline doctrine based on a notion of
core judicial matters in which an article Ill court must play more than an appellate role,
it had several inherent weaknesses. For one thing, the Court was obviously reluctant
to embark on a road that would call into question the validity of administrative
agencies.191 As a practical matter, the Justices may have concluded that measures
which keep the federal court caseload from expanding are not all that bad. 192 But
problems at the doctrinal level also impeded the development of Northern Pipeline.
Several of these have been discussed above, 193 for example Justice Brennan's reliance
on the public rights concept. Finally, the extreme difficulty in formulating a workable
test may raise questions about the validity of the whole enterprise. All of these
explanations have weight. There are, however, general themes in Burger Court
doctrine which shed further light on the retreat from Northern Pipeline.
A. Separation of Powers and Formalistic Analysis
Northern Pipeline and its successors coincided with the reliance on a highly
formalistic approach to separation of powers issues which guided the Court's two
major recent decisions in this area: Immigration & Naturalization Service v.
Chadha 94 and Bowsher v. Synar. 195 In Chadha the Court struck down the legislative
185. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 574-75 n.l (1985).
186. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3250 (1986).
187. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 (1982).
188. Resnik, supra note 25, at 616.
189. But see Krattenmaker, supra note 105, at 307 (rejecting arguments based on sufficiency of appellate review).
190. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 74-75 n.28 (1982).
192. See, e.g., Strauss, Formal and Functional, supra note 95, at 515.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 87-97.
194. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
195. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
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veto mechanism, holding that such a device was the enactment of law without
conformity to the specific provisions of article I governing how Congress is to make
laws. In Bowsher, the Court struck down a delegation of substantial authority over the
federal budget to the Comptroller General on the ground that Congress had too much
power to remove an official performing executive functions. Both cases took a
relatively absolutist approach to constitutional language and structure. They relied
heavily on the intent of the framers to create a particular model of government, and
rejected arguments for deviating from that model on grounds of convenience,
efficiency, and necessity. 196
These decisions have been sharply criticized, particularly on methodological
grounds. 19 7 The critics have faulted the Court for relying unduly on formalistic
notions of separation of powers instead of focusing on the functional aspects of that
doctrine, in particular preserving checks and balances and maintaining the necessary
tensions among the branches.19 These goals, it is asserted, can be achieved without
seeking refuge in literalism. Northern Pipeline, especially the plurality opinion, takes
very much the same approach. Indeed, some critics have grouped it with the other
separation of powers cases, and taxed it with the same shortcomings.199
Thus, it is tempting to view Thomas and Schor as the beginning of a general
rethinking by the Court of its approach to separation of powers issues. 2°0 Justice
O'Connor's majority opinions in those two cases abjure bright line tests, reject
literalism, and emphasize "practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire
reliance on formal categories . "..."201 Once again, there is a parallel between the
article II cases and post-National League of Cities developments. In the National
League of Cities context the Court also moved away from the apparent formalism of
its original decision, which rested in part on notions of zones of state autonomy, to
a pragmatic approach balancing state and national interests.
One could picture the Court as in flux over how to approach separation of
powers cases, with Thomas and Schor representing one end of the spectrum and
Bowsher, Northern Pipeline, and Chadha representing the other end. The problem
with this explanation is that Schor and Bowsher were decided on the same day, and
Justice O'Connor's opinion in the former case insists that it is consistent with the
latter. 202 The same Justices are formalistic in some separation of powers cases-those
involving articles I and fl-and functional in those cases involving article 1I.203 Do
the two groups of cases in fact present different separation of powers issues?
Justice O'Connor assayed an affirmative answer in Schor: "Unlike Bowsher,
this case raises no question of the aggrandizement of congressional power at the
196. E.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
197. E.g., The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HAsv. L. REv. 70, 185, 189-90 (1983).
198. E.g., The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, 100 HIARv. L. R'.. 100, 220, 228 (1986).
199. Id. at 227. See also Bruff, On the Constitutional Status ofthe Administrative Agencies, 36 Am. U. L. R v. 491,
504 (1987) (formalism "poorly suited to allocating adjudicative functions between courts and agencies.") [hereinafter
Bruff].
200. The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, 100 HARv. L. Rav. 100, 228 n.68 (1986).
201. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985).
202. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3261 (1986).
203. See Strauss, Formal and Functional, supra note 95, at 489.
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expense of a coordinate branch. Instead, the separation of powers question presented
in this case is whether Congress impermissibly underminded, without appreciable
expansion of its own powers, the role of the Judicial Branch." 2°4 In other words,
there is no great danger to structural values when Congress simply transfers some
matters from article III courts to alternative adjudicative bodies. Professor Peter
Strauss has argued that such an interpretation helps explain the difference in approach
between the article III and the article I and U1 cases. 205 In particular, he contends that
subtraction of the judicial branch's power in favor of an administrative agency poses
little threat to equilibrium among the three branches because each branch has ceded
some power to the agency. 2°6 For Strauss the only place for a formalistic approach
(and even here he has doubts) is cases where there is a direct clash between the
branches. 207
There is no such clash in the article LI cases. There, typically, a private litigant
finds it in his or her interest to raise structural considerations because they may work
to get the case dismissed or an undesirable result nullified.208 In the article I and U
cases, on the other hand, the political branches are likely to be parties or are likely
to intervene or otherwise seek to protect their interests. 209 In these cases a political
separation of powers dispute is being reenacted in the courtroom. In the article III
cases it is likely that no such dispute ever occurred in the first place; that is, the
underlying legislative scheme is not an attempt to sap or erode the judicial branch.
Given the difference, there is something to be said for a more flexible attitude, or so
the Court may have concluded.
Nevertheless, the same approach could have been taken in Northern Pipeline. It
is hard to find any congressional aggrandizement in that case either. Conversely, a
strict approach like that of Bowsher and Chadha could have been taken in Thomas
and Schor. Article I can be given a literal reading just like those articles that precede
it: if Congress is to create institutions which exercise the judicial power, they must
be courts as described therein. The Northern Pipeline doctrine, strictly applied,
ensures a tripartite system of government by guarding against erosion of the judicial
branch, a less tangible threat than direct encroachment, but a real possibility
nonetheless. Perhaps in Thomas and Schor the Court approached separation of
powers cases based on subtle distinctions between aggrandizement and dilution, but
an alternative (and complementary) explanation of Northern Pipeline's demise is
possible: for the current Court the judicial branch simply does not enjoy the same
fundamental constitutional status as the political branches. That is why inroads on its
204. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3261 (1986).
205. Strauss, Formal and Functional, supra note 95, at 517-19.
206. Id.; accord Bruff, supra note 199, at 503.
207. See Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Couni.
L. REv. 573, 578 (1984).
208. In Northern Pipeline, for example, the defendant's success in nullifying the entire structure of bankruptcy
courts would not prevent the contract claim against it from being litigated in a state court or a properly reconstituted federal
bankruptcy tribunal.
209. Thus, in Bowsher, the initial plaintiff was a Congressman, later joined by eleven others. Bowsher v. Synar,
106 S. Ct. 3181, 3185 (1986).
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authority do not call for the same degree of judicial vigilance as do alterations of the
balance of power between Congress and the President.
B. Burger Court Attitudes Toward the Article III Judiciary
An important theme of Burger Court jurisprudence has been the need to limit the
power and role of the federal courts and to guard against any expansion. 2 10 This
attitude is most clearly seen in the numerous cases denying standing to plaintiffs who
seek to challenge governmental action. The Court has increasingly sought to relate
standing to the doctrine of separation of powers. Indeed, in Allen v. Wright,211 the
most recent general treatment of the subject, Justice O'Connor declared that "the law
of [a]rt[icle] III standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of
powers." 212 This analysis goes beyond that of the Warren Court which recognized
that separation of powers concerns are one component of the general article III notion
of justiciability, but found that these concerns related to whether or not particular
issues should be heard in an article Im court, rather than to a party's standing to raise
them. 21 3
The separation of powers aspect of standing might simply dictate that article III
courts remain within their prescribed boundaries by not allowing access to persons
who fail to present cases or controversies. 21 4 The current Court sees standing as a
means of avoiding incursions into the legislative and executive domains. In Allen the
Court denied standing to plaintiffs who sought to restructure the Internal Revenue
Service's enforcement of tax exemptions for private schools, largely because of the
incursion on the executive branch that an affirmative decision would represent. 2 15
Justice O'Connor relied in part on the Constitution's assignment "to the Executive
Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to 'take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed."' 216 Taken to its extreme, this reliance would suggest that
executive branch interpretations of the law are so superior that no judicial review of
them is warranted. Clearly the majority is using standing as one means of restricting
the judiciary's power over the political branches.2 17
Indeed, the notion of the courts' inferior status vis-4-vis the political branches'
status seems to underlie the often repeated "concern about the proper and properly
limited-role of the courts in a democratic society.' '218 The actions of the political
branches derive their legitimacy from a form of popular consent which the judiciary
does not possess. 219 As Judge Robert Bork put it, a fundamental concern behind
210. See generally Brown, OfActivism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine's Implications for the Nature and Role
of the Federal Courts, 69 IowA L. Ra,. 617, 625-27 (1984).
211. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
212. Id. at 752.
213. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
214. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 783, 789-90 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 759-61.
216. Id. at 761.
217. For a critique of Allen v. Wright, see Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA.
L. Ra,. 635 (1985).
218. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
219. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180, 188-91 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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standing as a separation of powers concept "appears to be the need to limit the role
of the courts in the interplay of our various governmental institutions." The danger
which standing helps guard against is that of a Supreme Court majority acquiring
"something very like the power to govern the nation by continuously allocating
powers and inhibitions to every other governmental institution. '" 22 0
This concern with limiting the federal judiciary's power extends beyond the
public law concept of standing. The Court has resisted attempts to broaden the
domain of federal common law,22' and has emphasized the fundamental difference
between the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and the much broader
jurisdiction of the state courts. 222 A particularly influential statement of this general
view is Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago.223 He
argued against a hospitable approach to implying rights of action under federal
statutes as "an increase in the governmental power exercised by the federal
judiciary. "224 He viewed implication of rights of action as affecting a broad range of
persons and institutions, and concluded that separation of powers concerns dictate
that "the issue [be] resolved by the elected representatives in Congress after public
hearings, debate, and legislative decision. It is not a question properly to be decided
by relatively uninformed federal judges who are isolated from the political pro-
cess.''225 Justice Powell's opinion blends separation of powers analysis and the
traditional notion of limited federal court jurisdiction2 26 with the particular Burger
Court theme of the federal judiciary's inferior lawmaking competence. 227 Justice
Powell's views on the particular matter of implied rights appear to have prevailed, 228
although the issue is not free from doubt. 229 His general approach to federal judicial
power is that of the current Court.
There are two aspects of the cases referred to in this subsection which assume
particular importance for purposes of this Article. The first is that the result generally
is that an article I court does not adjudicate the matter. If the plaintiff lacks standing
there may be no judicial determination 230 or the matter may be remitted to the state
courts.231 Absent a private right of action, it may be remitted to an administrative
agency. 23 2 (The various forms of abstention and the Court's reaffirmation of the
220. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting); vacated sub nom. Burke v.
Barnes, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987).
221. E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 45 U.S. 304 (1981).
222. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717-18 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 730.
224. Id. at 743-44.
225. Id. at 731.
226. Id. at 730-31, 746 n.17.
227. Cf. id. at 748. See, e.g., United States v. Kimball Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 739-40 (1979); City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983). But cf. United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 927-28 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Despite "institutional limitations" on its ability to find
facts, the Court must make empirical judgments about the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.).
228. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 25 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
229. See Brown, supra note 210, at 629-35.
230. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (possibility that no person may have standing
to challenge the nondisclosure of the Central Intelligence Agency budget).
231. This would be the case, for example, with the generalized challenge to exclusionary zoning practices in Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
232. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 748-49 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). In Cannon
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eleventh amendment, both motivated by federalism concerns, produce the same
result.) The second point is that the wing of the Court taking these positions is also
that which has led the retreat from Northern Pipeline. It is the conservative Justices
who downplay the role of the federal judiciary in favor of concerns of separation of
powers and federalism. In the context of choice of an adjudicatory entity these same
Justices have concluded that deference to Congress' going outside article III does not
threaten important structural values. If the article III judiciary does not enjoy the same
status as the political branches, erosion of its power and role, by definition, is of less
concern, regardless of whether another branch is aggrandized.
Even so, it might be argued that fidelity to the constitutional text and
preservation of some tripartite system are conservative arguments for Justice
Brennan's position. But the text is ambiguous in that Congress is under no obligation
to create the lower federal judiciary at all. Why should a branch whose very existence
depends on the action of the other two merit the same level of constitutional status and
protection? Arguments based on judicial co-equality cannot invoke the constitutional
scheme in the same way that Congress (through article I) and the President (through
article II) can.
It is true that the post-Northern Pipeline cases are not based on Congress' article
II power to establish or not to establish lower federal courts. 233 Rather, the emphasis
is on Congress' ability to create tribunals to implement article I powers. However,
Justice White's majority opinion in Palmore v. United States,234 an important
forerunner of these cases, does rely heavily on the proposition that
the judicial power of the United States... is (except in enumerated instances applicable
exclusively to this court) dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes
of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the role power of creating
the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court)... and of investing them with jurisdiction
either limited, concurrent, or exclusive and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the
exact degree and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good. 35
The Court apparently sees little danger in erosion of something which has such a
tenuous claim to existence in the first place.
In sum, the retreat from Northern Pipeline seems less surprising than the fact
that Justice Brennan got away with that case in the first place. Nevertheless, Northern
Pipeline has not been overruled. Its dormant state creates a warning to Congress,
however faint, that there are limits, and reserves to the Court a greater authority to
enforce those limits than do the post-Northern Pipeline case-by-case balancing
approaches. To illustrate the applicability of any remaining Northern Pipeline
doctrine it may be helpful to examine briefly three pertinent areas.
itself, the private party complaining of sex-based discrimination in a federally funded program could trigger administrative
proceedings through a complaint, but could not participate in them. Id. at 706 n.41.
233. Indeed, in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3249 (1986), Justice O'Connor made a
somewhat cryptic reference to the fact that when Congress authorized the counterclaim jurisdiction its focus was on
effective regulation, "not on allocating jurisdiction among federal tribunals." Id. at 3260; see infra text accompanying
notes 259-61.
234. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
235. Id. at 401 (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845)).
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IV. TESTING THE VrrALrrY OF A NORTHERN Pn'_tnvE Docr-iN-TBREE AREAS
A. Administrative Adjudication
When Northern Pipeline was handed down critics argued that it cast serious
doubt on the validity of much administrative adjudication. 236 Disputes between
private parties heard before agencies did not fit under the public rights doctrine, and
it was exceedingly difficult to characterize the primary adjudicative body as simply
an adjunct of some article 11I court which might be called on to perform a perfunctory
review. Whatever precedential force Northern Pipeline retains, Thomas and Schor
make clear that it need no longer be perceived as a threat to the adjudicative role of
administrative agencies.
Both cases involved the administrative process. In Schor the agency performed
the adjudication; in Thomas the arbitrator's adjudication was closely related to the
agency's work. The Court first broadened the concept of public rights and then
essentially abandoned it. Even private state law claims can be adjudicated since the
source of the rights is only one relevant factor. Three aspects of agency adjudication
ensure that it will withstand article LII scrutiny, even the supposedly heightened level
called for when non-federal private claims are involved. 237 The most important aspect
of agency adjudication is that dispute resolution is only one part of a larger program
which Congress enacted pursuant to one of its article I powers and over which the
agency exercises substantial responsiblity. "The concerns that drove Congress to
depart from [a]rticle III" are now part of the Court's analysis, and in almost every
case it can be expected to show "due regard" for "the unique aspect of the
congressional plan at issue .... "238 A closely related point is that in carrying out
these programmatic responsibilities the agency may utilize adjudication as a means of
formulating policy as well as resolving specific disputes. 239 The final important
aspect of agency adjudication is that the Court may view it as superior to an article
1H trial. The agency has expertise, and its processes may be presented as more
expeditious. They also possess sufficient judicial qualities to insure fundamental
fairness.
In addition, the Court seems more or less to have adopted the position that
Justice White advocated in his Northern Pipeline dissent: appellate review essentially
satisfies whatever degree of article 111 involvement is required. 240 This is the "agency
model" on which Justice O'Connor relied in Schor.241 The question then arises as to
how much appellate review is enough. In his extensive analysis and critique of
Northern Pipeline, Professor Redish argues for a heightened standard of judicial
review as a better way of attaining the absolutist goals which underlie Justice
Brennan's opinion.242 Redish argues for "nondeferential review of agencies'
236. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587-88 (1985).
237. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Sehor, 106 S. Ct. 3249, 3259 (1986).
238. Id. at 3261.
239. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
240. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 115 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
241. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3249, 3258-59 (1986).
242. Redish, supra note 4, at 226-28.
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interpretation of their statutory mandate as well as their application of statutory
requirements to individual facts, and... reviewing with greater care than previously
used an agency's primary factual findings." 243
This is certainly an attractive fallback position, although it downplays the role
of article III courts as initial adjudicators. (It also undercuts the efficacy of the
administrative process, a price Professor Redish is apparently willing to pay.)
However, neither Justice Brennan nor the post-Northern Pipeline majority has
adopted this position. In Thomas, the extremely limited review of the arbitrator's
decision was acceptable to both Justice Brennan and rest of the Court .244 In Schor,
Justice O'Connor treated the existing standards of review as adequate, even while
indicating just how deferential they can be. 245 Justice Brennan's dissent dealt only
with the initial adjudication. 24 6 Thus, one is tempted to conclude that where
administrative adjudication is concerned Congress has a totally free hand,2 47 as long
as the initial disposition satisfies notions of due process and some appellate review is
available, particularly for constitutional questions. 248
In Schor, however, Justice O'Connor suggested two possible limits. Although
agency disposition of the state law counterclaim was permissible in that case,
"wholesale importation of concepts of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction into the
agency context may create greater constitutional difficulties. "249 On a more general
level, constitutional problems would arise if "Congress created a phalanx of
non-[a]rticle 1H tribunals equipped to handle the entire business of the article III
courts without any [a]rticle I supervision or control and without evidence of valid
and specific legislative necessities . ".. ,,' even if parties had the option not to
choose these forums.
In the first instance the rationale of Schor would probably work to sustain
whatever Congress did. After all, Congress would enact such provisions on an agency
by agency, or even a program by program, basis. In each case there would be weighty
justifications for the step tied to the exigencies of dispute resolution in the underlying
program. This is precisely Justice Brennan's point about the danger of incremental
erosion: case-by-case analysis may be unable to stop it. The "agency model" would
still be present, and the Court would uphold it. The "phalanx" hypothetical is
somewhat more problematical. If the agencies' role were to become "the entire
business of the article III courts" that would seem to be a substitution of the
administrative process for the judicial process without any link to a substantive
243. Id. at 227-28.
244. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592 (1985) (opinion of O'Connor, J.), id. at
601-02 (Brennan, J., concurring).
245. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3249, 3255 (1986) (Agency expertise is
superior to that of the court in determining whether regulation furthers the purpose of the statute; thus "substantial
deference" is warranted.).
246. E.g., id. at 3263.
247. See, e.g., Broff, supra note 199, at 502 (Schor "explicitly approved the existence of independent agencies, at
least for adjudication.").
248. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592-93, 601-02 (1985).
249. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3249, 3258 (1986).
250. Id. at 3260.
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regulatory program enacted pursuant to article I. (Congress does, of course, possess
an independent article I power over the creation and structure of the federal courts.)251
That would remove one of the principal underlying justifications of the post-Northern
Pipeline cases. Yet even here, Justice O'Connor goes so far as to suggest that
legislative necessity is an important variable which might save such a scheme. Of
course, Congress is unlikely to take any such step on a broad scale basis. For now,
it is enough to note that, in the area of administrative adjudication, Northern
Pipeline's bite is gone whatever the status of its bark.
B. Congressional Power over Federal Court Jurisdiction
Professor Resnik has suggested that when Justice Brennan wrote his strong
defense of the role of article m courts within the constitutional scheme he had one eye
on the "jurisdictional" bills which created a furor in Congress during the late 1970's
and early 1980's.252 These bills were generally not attempts to close all judicial
forums to some claimants. Their principal goal was to limit or eliminate the role of
the federal courts in specific subject areas such as school prayer.25 3 A principal
technique used was barring the lower federal courts from hearing such cases, thus
remitting challenges of state actions to state courts, or removing the subject matter
from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, or both.25 4 The proponents relied
primarily on Congress' power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus there
was considerable debate over whether article III contains any "internal" limits255 on
this power, that is, limits apart from those which would be imposed independently by
other provisions of the Constitution. Since Northern Pipeline and its progeny may
shed some light on this area with so little direct precedent, their implications for the
jurisdictional debate will be discussed briefly here.
As for the lower courts, it is hard to find internal limits on congressional power
in either the language or structure of article I. This is the overwhelming view of
academics, 256 and rests squarely on the Madisonian compromise.25 7 Thus, nothing in
article III appears to prevent Congress from "transferring" existing portions of lower
federal court jurisdiction to the state courts.25 8 Interestingly, the Madisonian
251. U.S. Co.,sr. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
252. Resnik, supra note 25, at 599. Proposals to curb federal court jurisdiction in controversial areas have been a
recurrent phenomenon throughout the nation's history. See Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court
Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. Rsv. 895, 896-97 (1984) [hereinafter Gunther].
253. For descriptions of the bills, see, e.g., Gunther, supra note 252, at 895-96; Resnik, supra note 25, at 599 n.89;
Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
95 H v. L. Rav. 17, 18 n.3 (1981).
254. For example, S. 481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) would have deprived both the lower federal courts and the
Supreme Court of jurisdiction over cases arising out of state and local laws concerning voluntary prayers in public schools
and buildings.
255. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 252, at 900.
256. See, e.g., id. at 912-13.
257. Madison, along with James Wilson, proposed to let Congress decide whether or not to create lower federal
courts. This "great compromise" between those who wanted a federal judiciary and those who feared one was pivotal
in securing the Convention's approval of the Constitution. See, e.g., Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control
the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. RE,. 45, 52-55 (1975).
258. The question remains whether the state courts are under an obligation to exercise the jurisdiction so transferred.
See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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compromise surfaced in Northern Pipeline itself, and the notion of broad congres-
sional power was accepted by both the plurality and the dissenters. In support of the
proposition that appellate review by an article III court is the principal vehicle for
satisfying separation of powers concerns, Justice White noted that Congress "clearly
possesses" the power to assign all bankruptcy matters to the state courts.259 Justice
Brennan responded that Congress' power to assign matters to the state courts was
inapplicable since those courts are not potentially subject to federal political control,
as non-article II federal bodies might be. 260 He posits a clear dichotomy: "The
Framers chose to leave to Congress the precise role to be played by the lower federal
courts in the administration of justice[,] ... [b]ut the Framers did not leave it to
Congress to define the character of those courts .. ,,261 Since Thomas and Schor
give Congress even greater leeway in utilizing non-article III federal adjudication, the
lack of internal article III constraints on assignment of initial matters is, if anything,
reinforced.
Congress' ability to limit Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction has been more
controverted. 262 The relevant language points to a plenary power-"with such
exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make" 263 -but the
imperatives of the constitutional structure militate against denying the Supreme
Court its dual role of ensuring the uniformity and supremacy of federal law,
especially the Constitution. 264 This consideration has led several commentators to
argue for an internal article III constraint over the exceptions and regulations clause.
Congress may not use this power to "destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court
in the constitutional plan," as Professor Hart put it.265 This approach, frequently
associated with the writings of Professor Ratner, 266 is generally referred to as the
essential functions test. Such an approach has considerable appeal, although its
critics 267 point to serious problems including the question of what power it leaves to
Congress268 and a major Supreme Court precedent which cuts in the direction of
plenary power. 269
Although extrapolation is necessary, it is possible to find support for the
essential functions test in Northern Pipeline and its progeny. As a starting point, any
underlying notion of a second class status for all federal courts is weakened by the
Constitution's explicit requirement that there "shall" be270 a Supreme Court. This
259. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 116 (1982) (dissenting opinion).
260. Id. at 64 n.15.
261. Id.
262. See Gunther, supra note 252, at 901.
263. U.S. Co-sr. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
264. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rv. 157,
161 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner].
265. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HIv.
L. REv. 1362, 1365 (1953).
266. E.g., Ratner, supra note 264.
267. E.g., Gunther, supra note 252, at 908-09.
268. Id. at 908.
269. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 vall.) 506 (1868).
270. "The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court . U.S. Co.sr. art. hI,
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part of the judiciary can assert co-equal status with more justification than the lower
courts. The Court's main role is that of an appellate tribunal. (Although it also has a
limited original jurisdiction.) Much of the focus in the Northern Pipeline trilogy is on
the role of appellate review, with the pragmatic majority coming close to saying that
appellate review is enough to satisfy article III. By implication then, lack of appellate
review would not satisfy article III, and the pragmatic position becomes one of a
requirement of some such review, at least for important questions such as constitu-
tional ones.271 This is also consistent with Justice Brennan's position; he argued in
Northern Pipeline that appellate review may be required even in public rights
cases.27 2 In Thomas he went further and stressed the general importance of courts'
ability to pass on questions of law as the key to their checking function.273 Any
requirement of appellate review strengthens the essential functions approach to
Supreme Court jurisdiction since only this court can provide both supremacy and
uniformity.
Indeed, much of the emphasis in the Northern Pipeline trilogy is on the need to
preserve the judiciary's essential role, and that specific term is sometimes used. 274
Even under Justice White's balancing approach, it seems that Congress would have
difficulty in justifying the inroads on article III values that eliminating the Supreme
Court's role in constitutional issues would represent. (This difficulty would be even
greater if no other article Ill court could pass on the question.) Even if Congress could
somehow prevail in a balancing equation, there are significant suggestions in the
post-Northern Pipeline opinions that absolute limits may exist. For example, the
Court will consider whether a particular statute "threatens the independent role of the
judiciary in our constitutional scheme." 2 75 Tampering with the Supreme Court's
essential role as the national appellate tribunal seems to constitute such a threat, apart
from any possible argument that Congress would be seeking to aggrandize its own
power in constitutional issues by tilting the outcome of cases in a particular direction.
Thus the Northern Pipeline doctrine, which began as an emphasis on initial
adjudication in article III courts, may well bear on arguments over internal article III
constraints with respect to appellate review. The notion of limits as adumbrated in the
Northern Pipeline trilogy does support the essential functions test.
C. Changing the Form of Adjudication Within the Article III Judicial System
Northern Pipeline, or what is left of it, poses seemingly slight obstacles to
removing matters from the article III judicial system, at least as long as federal
appellate review is available. Schor emphasizes the validity of the agency model. The
validity of state court adjudication is, of course, a fundamental component of the
Madisonian compromise. Might, however, the Northern Pipeline doctrine still
271. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592-93 (1985).
272. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 n.23 (1982).
273. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 601 n.4 (1985) (concurring opinion) (power to
interpret statutes checks executive power and that of administrative agencies).
274. E.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3249, 3258 (1986).
275. E.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590 (1985).
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impose constraints if Congress, or the district courts through local rules, attempt to
alter the form of adjudication within article I courts? This is a question of
considerable practical importance, given the general interest in forms of alternative
dispute resolution and the increasing use of magistrates276 and techniques such as
court-annexed arbitration. 277 These techniques are aimed at reducing the mounting
backlog within the federal courts, whose caseload is perceived as a serious
impediment to doing justice.278 In any such devices there are obviously direct echoes
of the system of bankruptcy judges that was at issue in Northern Pipeline itself.
At first one must consider whether this is really a different problem from the
removal of matters from article II courts. Any substantial change in the mode of
adjudication can certainly reach the point of taking cases "out" of article II
resolution as it is generally known and placing them in the hands of the alternate
mechanism. Thus the post-Northern Pipeline balancing test might be applied here just
as in other contexts. Northern Pipeline itself shows how the lines can be blurred; did
that case involve removal from article 1I1 or an alteration in existing forms of
adjudication? After all, Congress was careful to label the new decisionmakers
"bankruptcy judges," and treated the system as existing within the federal district
courts. 279 For Justice Brennan, of course, this was a "facade." 2 30 Nevertheless, the
lines are not easy to draw.
Despite this uncertainty it may be helpful to view the alteration of article I
adjudication as a separate and somewhat different problem from removal of matters
from article III courts. Devices such as magistrates are placed within the judicial
system and are ostensibly a part thereof. 281 Thus, public perceptions and expectations
as to how the federal judiciary operates are relevant in evaluating subtle and
somewhat invisible changes in that mode of operation. The adjudication is not
transferred to an entity which can claim a distinct and legitimate existence in its own
right, as is the case with states and agencies. States are a separate, integral component
of the constitutional system, and agencies are now generally recognized as a fourth
branch of government carrying out identifiable substantive programmatic responsi-
bilities of their own. To the extent that alterations of current court decisionmaking are
viewed as occurring within the judiciary, the formalistic approach which the Supreme
Court utilized in Chadha may come into play. Just as that case held that there is only
276. See, e.g., Note, The Boundaries of Article Illh Delegation of Final Decisionmaking Authority to Magistrates,
52 U. Ctu. L. REV. 1032 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Boundaries].
277. See Levin & Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal District Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 29, 32
(1985).
278. See, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 547 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1985).
279. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 (1982).
280. Id. at 86.
281. See, e.g., Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16 CREGHTON L. REv. 441, 456-57 (1983)
(difference between administrative adjudication and "allowing nontenured judges to exercise the jurisdiction vested by
statute in article Il courts themselves.") (footnote omitted); cf. Krattenmaker, supra note 105, at 310 (Congress could
not create specialized courts and grant to their nontenured judges "the inherently judicial power to interpret and apply
federal statutes."). Such an analysis assumes an ability to distinguish between administrative adjudication (agencies do
"interpret and apply" statutes after all) and adjudication by nontenured judges within the article HIl judicial system. See
id. at 311.
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one way to legislate, 28 2 a similarly inclined Court might hold that there is only one
way to adjudicate. As Justice Brennan put it in Northern Pipeline, "the Framers did
not leave it to Congress to define the character of [federal] courts .... "283 The
Northern Pipeline doctrine deals ultimately with the danger of erosion of the current
role of the federal judiciary. That danger may be present here in potentially far
reaching forms.
One can illustrate the general problem by reference to the growing use of
magistrates at the district court level. This practice is authorized by the Federal
Magistrates Act of 1979,284 and is supplemented by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure285 and local rules of the federal district courts. 28 6 Magistrates perform a
wide range of functions, including hearing various pre-trial motions and adjudicating
entire cases if the parties so consent. The former function has been upheld on the
ground that the district judge reviews the magistrate's work and makes the ultimate
decision. 287 It is the latter aspect of magistrate practice which may present
constitutional problems under Northern Pipeline. Indeed, after that case was handed
down, the consensual reference of cases became the subject of considerable dispute
within the lower courts. The courts of appeal have been unanimous in upholding the
validity of magistrate decision of entire cases despite arguments based on Northern
Pipeline.288 Nevertheless, there have been dissents, 28 9 warnings from court majorities
that the situation could change, 290 and opposing points of view among commenta-
tors. 29
1
The post-Northern Pipeline cases relied on the approach to adjuncts which
Justice Brennan utilized in his plurality opinion.292 (Since magistrates can handle the
entire gamut of civil cases, the public rights approach, at least as outlined in Northern
Pipeline, simply would not stretch far enough to validate their jurisdiction.) The
magistrate disposition of cases looks a good deal like the system of bankruptcy judges
struck down in Northern Pipeline itself. In particular it is the magistrate who
performs the basic adjudication and renders the equivalent of a final district court
judgment in a normal civil case. However, the courts of appeals have relied on the
general notion that the district courts exercise enough control over the magistrate to
make him or her a genuine adjunct as opposed to the spurious adjuncts which Justice
Brennan found present in Northern. Pipeline.293 In part this control is exercised
282. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983).
283. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64 n.15 (1982) (emphasis added).
284. 28 U.S.C. § 631 (1982).
285. FED. R. Crv. P. 72-76.
286. The Act contemplates such rules. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2), (4).
287. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681-82 (1980).
288. See, e.g., Note, Boundaries, supra note 276, at 1034 n.16 (collecting cases).
289. E.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 547 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
bane), (Schroeder, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1985).
290. E.g., id. at 546 (declining to invalidate consensual reference practice "at this stage in the evolution of the
magistrate system").
291. Compare Harvard Magistrate Note, supra note 101 (upholding practice) with Note, Boundaries, supra note
276 (arguing for unconstitutionality).
292. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76-87 (1982).
293. See, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 544 (9th Cir. 1984)
(en bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1985).
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through appellate review,294 although that would seem clearly insufficient under
Northern Pipeline. In addition, the courts of appeals have relied on other controls
which the district courts exercise over the magistrates, including naming them to the
position295 and retaining the power to remove specific cases from a magistrate if
special circumstances so warrant. 296 (Of course, the negative aspect of this general
control might well be a lack of independence in the magistrates, given the degree of
power which the district courts hold over them.)2 97
The courts of appeals have also emphasized the role which consent plays in the
referral of an entire case to a magistrate. 298 It is not clear how significant a role the
lack of consent played in Northern Pipeline itself.299 But even in Schor Justice
O'Connor said that consent could not allow an impairment of structural values,
matters which it is not within the province of individual litigants to waive. 300 It has
been argued that consent is simply irrelevant to a constitutional assessment of the use
of magistrates. 30° On the other hand, the presence of consent provides a possible
analogy to settlement and alternative devices under which the parties opt out of
coming to court for a decision.
Even with consent, however, it is hard to see how under a strict application of
Northern Pipeline the magistrates' civil jurisdiction passes muster. What the
magistrate does looks like a full-blown adjudication rather than any alternative
thereto. Yet this adjudication is performed within the federal judicial system by
persons who are not article HI judges. The district courts' supposed general controls
do not relate to specific cases. Case specific controls, notably the ability to remove
cases from a magistrate, are unlikely to be used, and the standards for their use are
unclear. 302 Nonetheless, the courts of appeals have erected a substantial wall of
authority in favor of magistrate adjudication. 30 3
If magistrate decision of entire cases could survive a concerted attack based on
Northern Pipeline, it is tempting to conclude that such an attack is a fortiori doomed
to failure given the attitude and analysis of the successor cases. The precise status of
"adjunct" analysis is not clear. Justice O'Connor did not use it in Schor. She may
294. E.g., id. at 545-46. See generally, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), (4) (1982) (providing right of appeal).
295. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 545 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1985).
296. Id. Some commentators have read the act to require initial reference by the district court on a case-by-case
basis. E.g., Harvard Magistrate Note, supra note 101, at 1959 n.62. This seems to be an incorrect reading. The Act
appears to contemplate a general designation of specific magistrates by each court "to exercise civil jurisdiction" under
the consensual provision. See also Fit. R. Crv. P. 73(a), (b). But see Note, Boundaries, supra note 276, at 1060 n. 155.
297. See Note, Boundaries, supra note 276 at 1062-63.
298. E.g., Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 925-26 (3d Cir. 1983).
299. All of the Justices noted the absence of consent to having the bankruptcy court hear the state law claim, but
this does not seem to be a major factor in the various analyses. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 80 n.31 (1982) (opinion of Brennan, J.); 91 (Rehnquist, I., concurring); 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
95 (White, I., dissenting). But see Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3249, 3256 (1986) (absence
of consent a "significant factor" in Northern Pipeline).
300. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3249, 3257-58 (1986).
301. Harvard Magistrate Note, supra note 101, at 1952-54.
302. See Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 552 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1985), (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (lack of statutory guidance over exercise of
controls).
303. See Note, Boundaries, supra note 276 at 1034.
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not have wished to refer to agencies as adjuncts, or she may have wished to collapse
Justice Brennan's inquiry-exceptional congressional authority/public rights or
adjunct status-into a single approach guided essentially by three factors: the extent
to which essential judicial power is maintained, origin and importance of the rights
at issue, and the concerns that impelled Congress. In any event, let us assume that
alterations of adjudication within the existing system will be analyzed in the same
way as removal of cases from the system, rather than being analyzed in a highly
formalistic Chadha-like approach. How does magistrate decision of civil cases fare
under the three factor approach?
As for the essential attributes of judicial power, a right of appeal from magistrate
decisions does exist. As argued above, the presence of an appeal to an article III court
appears in Schor and Thomas to satisfy any essential judicial role. Moreover, the
appellate court may exercise less deference to the magistrate's decision, particularly
in the area of law, than would be the case with an agency, given the practice of
deference to agency expertise. 3° 4 Of course, whatever value can be attached to the
various additional controls which district courts exercise over magistrates makes them
a plus in the equation, since there are no such controls over agencies. The origin and
importance of the rights at issue may no longer be an important factor, given the
relative demise of the public rights doctrine. In Schor, the agency could hear even
state law claims. Therefore the sweeping range of the magistrates' jurisdiction may
not be a strong argument for its invalidity. As for the congressional concerns
underlying the magistrate system, the obvious ones relate to the backlog in the federal
courts, and improving the efficacy of those tribunals. Similar concerns were cited by
the Court in both Schor and Thomas as the sort to which a reviewing court should give
weight. 305 Indeed, Crowell v. Benson itself cited such considerations as valid reasons
for Congress to act in the area of dispute resolution. 3° 6
Upon closer scrutiny, however, it can certainly be argued that application of the
three, admittedly malleable, factors utilized in Schor raises doubts about the consti-
tutionality of magistrate adjudication of entire cases. Consider the issue of congres-
sional concern. Congress' desire to reduce court backlog is not tied to any substantive
article I program of which adjudication is a necessary part. This is an important
distinction from the "agency model" referred to in Schor. Agencies are responsible
for implementing a congressional program and utilize adjudication to formulate policy
as well as to resolve disputes under that program. Congress does possess a general
power over the organization and operation of the lower federal tribunals, 307 and that
may be broad indeed, ranging from housekeeping and mechanical details to juris-
dictional amounts and to the very existence of these courts. Nonetheless it is not clear
that this is a general power over dispute resolution which goes so far as to permit
304. But see Resnik, supra note 25, at 608.
305. E.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 590 (1985) (citing "near disaster" of prior
system).
306. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932).
307. U.S. Co.'sr. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (Constitutional provision
for federal court system, augmented by necessary and proper clause, includes power to make rules governing practice and
procedure.).
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alteration of the fundamental nature of one of the three branches of the national
government. This may be one of those instances in which the greater power does not
include a seemingly lesser one. It seems difficult to describe Congress' power over
the lower federal courts as somehow "exceptional," a mode of analysis which played
a considerable role in Northern Pipeline and which may still be relevant in a balancing
process. As noted, there is no independent programmatic justification outside of the
operation of the courts themselves, unless one is prepared to make the somewhat
tenuous argument that the overall operation of congressional programs is impeded
since recourse to the federal courts, which is frequently tied to their enforcement, has
now become so difficult as to impair the utility of those underlying programs.
As to the type of right adjudicated, Schor is not necessarily a precedent for the
proposition that anything goes. There the state law based claim of the broker for
commissions due was closely related to the customer's federal law claim of illegal
acts in connection with commodity futures trading. In order to facilitate adjudication
of that right in Congress' chosen forum there was-much to be said for allowing a
limited counterclaim jurisdiction. The magistrates' consensual jurisdiction, on the
other hand, runs the entire gamut of civil cases which might come before the district
courts. In no way can it be justified as a "specialized" area, as was the case, to some
extent, with the bankruptcy judges in Northern Pipeline.30 8 The expertise of the
magistrates would seem to be identical with that of the federal district judges
themselves, yet the former do not enjoy the guarantees of article III.
Much then may turn on the first factor: preserving the essential attributes of
judicial power. Again, the central question is whether a meaningful role in the initial
adjudication of some matters is one of these attributes. The justifications for
emphasizing initial adjudication discussed above in defense of Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion are relevant here. 30 9 It may well be important to retain the role of
the federal judiciary, especially the judge (acting with a jury when required or
appropriate), as the primary dispute resolver within the federal government. This is
what the judicial branch does. Widespread use of magistrates to decide entire cases
alters the way in which the institution functions and blurs accountability for its
operations. Magistrates look like judges both because of what they do and where they
are. Perhaps in dealing with magistrates the first factor should be restated as the need
to preserve the essential attributes of judicial power within the federal courts when
those courts are used as the adjudicative mechanism.
There may also be questions as to the quality of decisions rendered by magis-
trates.310 These individuals are not likely to be of the same caliber as presidential
appointees to the federal bench, and their decisions may reflect this difference.
Nevertheless, their decisions will be viewed to some extent as coming from the federal
courts themselves, and may even acquire a degree of precedential value. 31t Of course,
308. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 117-18 (1982) (White, J.,
dissenting) (discussing bankruptcy courts as specialized tribunals).
309. See supra text accompanying notes 108-117.
310. See, e.g., Note, Boundaries, supra note 276, at 1064.
311. Id. at 1059.
[Vol. 49:55
NORTHERN PIPELINE
arguments for keeping the federal judiciary attractive to high caliber candidates may
argue for greater use of magistrates. If magistrates, and similar alternative adjudi-
cators, serve to rid the judges of small or insignificant cases use of these techniques
may satisfy concerns voiced by those such as Justice Scalia on the drudgery increas-
ingly associated with the federal judicial function.3 12 Still, to paraphrase Chadha, the
convenience of judges cannot by itself be sufficient justification for altering the basic
structure of governmental institutions within the tripartite system.
This last point underscores the fact that devices like the use of magistrates are
not likely to come from Congress out of hostility to the courts. Judges may even be
the moving force in instituting the use of such devices. For example, it is conceivable
that some forms of alternative dispute resolution which reduce the role of the judge
will find their origin in local rules of court passed under broad congressional
delegations 313 rather than being authorized by a specific statute such as the
Magistrates Act. Although Justice Blackmun once seemed to suggest that it was
alright for the judges to erode their own power,314 the spirit of article III may call for
direct congressional involvement in any scheme that can alter the functions of one of
the three basic institutions. In other words, dilution of the federal judicial power
raises such serious separation of powers questions that Congress ought to consider
them specifically. Perhaps delegation of the power to make local rules should be
narrowly construed so as not to embrace such steps. 315
The spirit of article III also calls for considerable hesitancy in allowing Congress
to take such a step, regardless of how benign the motive. Justice O'Connor's
"phalanx" hypothetical indicates that there are article III limits in this area. 316
Perhaps the prophylactic approach of Northern Pipeline is even more necessary in
making changes within the federal judicial system than in removing classes of cases
to a clearly different forum with its own forms of visibility and accountability.
This is potentially true for other dispute resolution devices, as well as for
magistrates. (A principal problem is drawing a line between encouraging parties to go
outside the judicial system to resolve disputes and making changes in the methods of
adjudication within that system. It is the latter which raise essential attributes
problems.)317 The fact that widespread use of magistrates is relatively new can cut in
either of two directions. On the one hand, since it is an experiment, perhaps the courts
in reviewing it should take a hands-off attitude in order to see how things develop. 318
312. See Taylor, Scalia Proposes Major Overhaul of U.S. Courts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
313. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982) (general rule-making power of federal courts).
314. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 685 (1980) (concurring opinion).
315. This objection may have less force with respect to specific delegations such as those in the Magistrates Act.
316. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3249, 3260 (1986).
317. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 recognizes such a line. Rule 16(c) lists "Subjects to be Discussed at Pretrial
Conferences." These include "the advisability of referring matters to a magistrate or master" (16(c)(6)) and "the
possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute" (16(c)(7)) (emphasis added). The
Advisory Committee's notes describe Rule 16(c)(7) as "exploring the use of procedures other than litigation to resolve
the dispute. This includes urging the litigants to employ adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse." Amendment of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 28, 1983, Effective August
1, 1983, with Advisory Committee Notes Thereon, reprinted in FEneRAs. Rut s oF CivIL PRocEruR 355 (Foundation 1987).
318. See, Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 546 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1985).
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On the other hand, there is no entrenched mechanism or set of established
expectations which would be disturbed by subjecting any such new techniques to
extremely strict scrutiny. 319 Courts of appeals have suggested that the system might
somehow go too far. 320 If that perception is correct it may result in application of the
Northern Pipeline doctrine even in its altered, watered-down form.
V. CONCLUSION
The article III cases discussed above are replete with ironies. Justice Brennan,
the Court's ultimate liberal, emerges as the staunch defender of the conservative
doctrines of separation of powers321 and strict construction. In Northern Pipeline he
attempted to do for the federal courts what Justice Rehnquist attempted to do for the
states in National League of Cities: erect absolute barriers to protect governmental
entities against congressional erosion of their institutional status. In the article In
context, however, the conservative majority downgrades these concerns in favor of
governmental convenience and falls back on a possibly toothless balancing test as the
measure of legislative validity. These Justices are in part concerned with preserving
the administrative state, a goal not always associated with conservatives generally. 322
The strict approach to separation of powers issues found in the Burger Court's article
I and article II cases simply vanishes.
This Article has examined the Court's movement from Northern Pipeline and its
equally strict approach to the flexibility of Thomas and Schor. Several explanations
of this development are possible. One explanation seems to be the current Court's
willingness to relegate the article HI judiciary to a lesser status than the political
branches. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, to find Justice Brennan going in the
opposite direction, albeit by an unexpected route.
The remaining questions concern what is left of Northern Pipeline. What has
been referred to here as the Northern Pipeline doctrine-a requirement that "core"
judicial matters be litigated at all stages in article I courts-has been first watered
down and then, seemingly, abandoned. Nevertheless, Northern Pipeline has not been
overruled. The Northern Pipeline trilogy is perhaps relevant to debates over the
Supreme Court's essential role. Could Northern Pipeline itself rise again to strike
down a congressional authorization of non-article El adjudication that went too far?
The answer may well be no, given what was done and said in Thomas and Schor. Yet
the Northern Pipeline doctrine, in some form, might still bear on efforts to alter the
form of adjudication within article III courts. Perhaps it is here that the greatest
danger of erosion of the judiciary lies: preventing that erosion is the essence of
Northern Pipeline.
319. This was the case with the administrative adjudication mechanisms which Northern Pipeline possibly called
into question.
320. See, e.g., Gems v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1984).
321. See McConnell, The Counter-Revolution in Legal Thought, 41 Poucv Rsv. 18, 20 (Summer, 19,87) (expressing
approval of the Court's recent emphasis on separation of powers). 1,
322. See, e.g., Taylor, Conservatives Assert Legal Presence, N.Y. TimesFeb. 1, 1987, at 18, col. 1 (Judge Robert
Bork criticized by conservatives for stating that the regulatory heritage of the New Deal is firmly established as a
constitutional matter).
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